La ONU y la globalización. por Michel Schooyans Un análisis sobre lo que suponen los proyectos de unificación política, integración económica, la Globalización y el holismo, la «Carta de la Tierra», las religiones y el globalismo, el pacto económico mundial, los proyectos para un sistema de derecho internacional positivo y la pretensión de una «gobernancia» global . | |
| Los términos «mundialización» y «globalización» son hoy en día parte del vocabulario corriente. Ambos conceptos se utilizan indistintamente para indicar que, en escala mundial, los intercambios se multiplicaron rápidamente, lo que se hace evidente en los sectores científicos, técnicos y culturales. La multiplicación de intercambios se tornó posible gracias a sistemas de comunicación más rápidos y eficaces. Dentro de este primer sentido corriente, los términos mundialización y globalización evocan la interdependencia de las sociedades humanas. Una crisis económica en los Estados Unidos, decisiones de la OPEP sobre el precio del petróleo, las tensiones entre palestinos e israelíes --para citar apenas algunos ejemplos-- tienen repercusiones de carácter mundial. Nos vemos comprometidos, interpelados e incluso afectados por catástrofes que pasan lejos de nosotros, sentimos nuestra responsabilidad frente al hambre y la enfermedad en todo el mundo. Las propias religiones dialogan intensamente. Inclusive dentro de la Iglesia católica, las comunicaciones se intensificaron. Adquirimos así una aguda conciencia de que pertenecemos a la comunidad humana. En este primer sentido, habitual, hablamos de «integración». En lenguaje común se dice que «las distancias no cuentan más», que «los viajes aproximan a los hombres», que «el mundo se convirtió en una aldea». El mundo tiende a una mayor unidad. En principio deberíamos alegrarnos. Es natural que la nueva situación lleve a que se consideren nuevas estructuras políticas y económicas que procuren brindar respuesta a nuevas necesidades. Sin embargo, ello no puede realizarse a cualquier precio y de cualquier manera (1). Unificación política, integración económica Desde hace algunos años, el sentido de las palabras mundialización y globalización se hizo un poco más preciso. Por mundialización, se entiende ahora, la tendencia que lleva a la organización de un único gobierno mundial. El acento se coloca sobre la dimensión política de la unificación del mundo. En su forma actual, tal tendencia fue desarrollada por diversas corrientes estudiadas por los internacionalistas (2). En esta línea de pensamiento basta citar dos ejemplos. El primer modelo remonta al final de los años 60 y es de autoría de Zbigniev Brzezinski (3). Según esta visión, Estados Unidos debe reformular su tradicional mesianismo y asumir la conducción mundial. Deben organizar las sociedades políticas particulares tomando en cuenta una tipología que las clasifica en tres categorías según su grado de desarrollo. La mundialización se define aquí a partir de un proyecto hegemónico con una disyuntiva esencial: imponer la Pax americana o sumergirse en el caos. Al final de los años ochenta surge otro proyecto mundialista, del cual Billy Brandt es uno de los principales artesanos. El Norte (desarrollado) y el Sur (en desarrollo) necesitan uno del otro; sus intereses son recíprocos. Resulta urgente tomar nuevas medidas internacionales para superar el abismo que los separa. Dichas iniciativas deben ser tomadas en el plano político; deben incidir prioritariamente sobre el sistema monetario, el desarme, el hambre. Según el «programa de supervivencia» del informe Brandt, es preciso crear «un mecanismo de vigilancia de alto nivel» que tendría por principal misión tornar a la ONU más eficaz, así como consolidar el consenso que la caracteriza (4). El concepto de mundialización que aparece aquí no se vincula de manera alguna a un proyecto hegemónico. Se sitúa en la tradición de la «internacional socialista». Sin duda, no se llega a recomendar la supresión de los Estados, pero la soberanía de estos debería limitarse y colocarse bajo el control de un poder mundial, si queremos garantizar la supervivencia de la humanidad. Al mismo tiempo en que el término «mundialización» adquiere una connotación esencialmente política, la palabra globalización adquiere una connotación fundamentalmente económica. La multiplicación de los intercambios y la mejora de las comunicaciones internacionales estimulan a hablar de una integración de los agentes económicos a nivel mundial. Las diversas actividades económicas serían divididas entre los diferentes Estados o regiones. El trabajo sería dividido: a unos les corresponderían, por ejemplo, las tareas de extracción, a otros, aquellas de transformación. Finalmente, en la cúspide del sistema de toma de decisiones, se encontrarían aquellos avocados a las tareas de producción tecnológica y de coordinación mundial. Dicha visión de la globalización es francamente liberal. Sin embargo, con una cierta reserva: aunque sean preconizadas de manera amplia la libre circulación de bienes y capitales, lo mismo no se da con respecto a la libre circulación de personas (5). Globalización y holismo En los documentos recientes de la ONU, el tema de la globalización surge con más frecuencia que el de la mundialización, no obstante ambos conceptos no son contradictorios ni compiten entre sí. La ONU incorpora las concepciones corrientes que acabamos de mencionar. Sin embargo, aprovecha la percepción favorable a la actual concepción de la globalización para someter esa palabra a una alteración semántica. La globalización es reinterpretada a la luz de una nueva visión del mundo y del lugar del hombre en el mundo. Esta nueva visión se denomina «holismo». Esta palabra, de origen griego, significa que el mundo constituye un todo, dotado de más realidad y más valor que las partes que lo componen. En ese todo, el surgimiento del hombre no es más que un avatar en la evolución de la materia. El destino inexorable del hombre es la muerte, desaparecer en la Madre-Tierra, de donde nació. El gran todo, llamémoslo así para simplificar, la Madre-Tierra, o Gaia, trasciende por lo tanto al hombre. Este debe doblarse a los imperativos de la ecología, a las conveniencias de la Naturaleza. La persona no solamente debe aceptar no destacarse más en el medio ambiente; sino que debe también aceptar no ser más el centro del mundo. Según dicha lectura, la ley «natural» no es más aquella escrita en su inteligencia y en su corazón; es la ley implacable y violenta que la Naturaleza impone al hombre. La vulgata ecológica presenta al hombre como un predador, y como toda población de predadores, la población humana debe, de acuerdo con esta concepción, ser contenida dentro de los límites de un desarrollo sustentable. La persona, por lo tanto, no sólo debe aceptar sacrificarse hoy a los imperativos de Madre-Gaia, sino que también debe aceptar sacrificarse a los imperativos de los tiempos venideros. La «Carta de la Tierra» La ONU está en proceso de elaborar un documento muy importante sistematizando esa interpretación holística de la globalización. Se trata de la «Carta de la Tierra», de la cual innumerables borradores ya fueron divulgados y cuya redacción se encuentra en fase final. Dicho documento sería invocado no sólo para superar a la «Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos de 1948», sino también, según algunos, para reemplazar al propio Decálogo. Veamos, a título de ejemplo, algunos extractos de dicha Carta: Nos encontramos en un momento crítico de la historia de la Tierra, el momento de escoger su destino... Debemos unirnos para fundar una sociedad global durable, fundada en el respeto a la naturaleza, los derechos humanos universales, la justicia económica y la cultura de la paz... La humanidad es parte de un vasto universo evolutivo... El medio ambiente global, con sus recursos finitos, es una preocupación común a todos los pueblos. La protección de la vitalidad, de la diversidad y de la belleza de la Tierra es un deber sagrado... Un aumento sin precedentes de la población humana sobrecargó los sistemas económicos y sociales... En consecuencia, nuestra opción es formar una sociedad global para cuidar de la Tierra y cuidarnos los unos a los otros o exponernos al riesgo de destruirnos a nosotros mismos y destruir la diversidad de vida... Precisamos con urgencia de una visión compartida respecto de los valores básicos que ofrezcan un fundamento ético a la comunidad mundial emergente... Las religiones y el globalismo Para consolidar dicha visión holística del globalismo, deben ser aplanados algunos obstáculos y elaborados ciertos instrumentos. Las religiones en general, y en primer lugar la religión católica, figuran entre los obstáculos que se deben neutralizar. Fue con ese objetivo que se organizó, dentro del marco de las celebraciones del milenio en septiembre del 2000, la Cumbre de líderes espirituales y religiosos. Se busca lanzar la «Iniciativa unida de las religiones» que tiene entre sus objetivos velar por la salud de la Tierra y de todos los seres vivos. Fuertemente influenciado por la New Age, dicho proyecto apunta a la creación de una nueva religión mundial única, lo que implicaría inmediatamente la prohibición a todas las otras religiones de hacer proselitismo. Según la ONU, la globalización no debe envolver apenas las esferas de la política, de la economía, del derecho; debe envolver el alma global. Representando a la Santa Sede, el Cardenal Arinze no aceptó firmar el documento final, que colocaba a todas las religiones en un mismo pie de igualdad (6). El pacto económico mundial Entre los numerosos instrumentos elaborados por la ONU respecto de la globalización, merece ser mencionado aquí el «Pacto mundial». En su discurso de apertura al Forum del Milenio, el Sr. Kofi Annan retomó la invitación que dirigiera en 1999 al Forum económico de Davos. Proponía «la adhesión a ciertos valores esenciales en los ámbitos de las normas de trabajo, de los derechos humanos y del medio ambiente». El Secretario General garantizaba que de esa manera se reducirían los efectos negativos de la globalización. Más precisamente, según Annan, para superar el abismo entre el Norte y el Sur, la ONU debería hacer un amplio llamado al sector privado. Se procuraba obtener la adhesión a ese pacto de un gran número de actores económicos y sociales: compañías, hombres de negocios, sindicatos, Organizaciones de la sociedad civil. Dicho «Global Compact», o «Pacto mundial», sería una necesidad para regular los mercados mundiales, para ampliar el acceso a las tecnologías vitales, para distribuir la información y el saber, para divulgar los cuidados básicos en materia de salud, etc. Dicho pacto ya recibió numerosos apoyos, entre otros, de la Shell, de Ted Turner, propietario de la CNN, de Bill Gates e incluso de numerosos sindicatos internacionales. El «Pacto mundial» suscita, es obvio, grandes interrogantes. ¿Será que podremos contar con las grandes compañías mundiales para resolver los problemas que ellas hubieran podido contribuir a resolver hace mucho tiempo si lo hubiesen deseado? ¿La multiplicación de los intercambios económicos internacionales justifica la instauración progresiva de una autoridad centralizada, llamada a regir la actividad económica mundial? ¿De qué libertad gozarán las organizaciones sindicales si las legislaciones laborales, incorporadas al derecho internacional, deben someterse a los «imperativos» económicos «globales»? ¿Qué poder de intervención tendrán los gobiernos de los Estados soberanos para actuar en nombre de la justicia, en las cuestiones económicas, monetarias y sociales? Aún más grave: a la luz de la precariedad financiera de la ONU, ¿no se corre el riesgo de que dicha organización sea víctima de una tentativa de compra por parte de un consorcio de grandes compañías mundiales? Un proyecto político servido por el derecho Sin embargo, es en el plano político y jurídico que el proyecto onusiano de la globalización se hace más inquietante. En la medida en que la ONU, influenciada por la New Age, desarrolla una visión materialista, estrictamente evolucionista del hombre, desactiva la concepción realista que está subyacente en la «Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos de 1948». Según esta visión materialista, el hombre, pura materia, es definitivamente incapaz de descubrir la verdad sobre sí mismo o sobre el sentido de su vida. De esta forma es reducido al agnosticismo de principio, al escepticismo y al relativismo moral. Los ¿por qué? no tienen sentido alguno; sólo importan los ¿cómo? La «Declaración» de 1948 presentaba la prodigiosa originalidad de fundar las nuevas relaciones internacionales en la extensión universal de los derechos humanos. Tal debería ser el fundamento de la paz y del desarrollo. Tal debería ser la base legitimando la existencia y justificando la misión de la ONU. El orden mundial debería ser edificado sobre verdades fundadoras, reconocidas por todos, protegidas y promovidas progresivamente a través de la legislación de todos los Estados. La ONU hoy desactivó esas referencias fundadoras. Hoy los derechos humanos no están más fundados en una verdad que se impone a todos y es por todos libremente reconocida: la igual dignidad de todos los hombres. De aquí en adelante los derechos humanos son el resultado de procedimientos consensuales. Se argumenta que no somos capaces de alcanzar la verdad respecto de la persona, y que inclusive dicha verdad no es accesible o no existe. Debemos entonces entrar en acuerdo, y decidir, por un acto de pura voluntad, cuál es la conducta justa, ya que las necesidades de acción nos apremian. Pero no decidiremos refiriéndonos a valores que se nos imponen por la simple fuerza de su verdad. Vamos a comprometernos en un procedimiento de discusión y, después de escuchar la opinión de cada uno, adoptaremos una decisión. Esta decisión será considerada justa porque es el resultado efectivo del procedimiento consensual. Se reconoce aquí la influencia de John Rawls. Los «nuevos derechos humanos», según la ONU actual, surgirán a partir de procedimientos consensuales que pueden ser reactivados indefinidamente. No son más la expresión de una verdad inherente a la persona; son la expresión de la voluntad de aquellos que deciden. De aquí en adelante, mediante tal procedimiento, cualquier cosa podrá ser presentada como «nuevo derecho» de la persona: derecho a uniones sexuales diversas, al repudio, a hogares monoparentales, a la eutanasia, mientras se aguarda el infanticidio, ya practicado, la eliminación de deficientes físicos, los programas eugenésicos, etc. Es por dicha razón que en las asambleas internacionales organizadas por la ONU, los funcionarios de esta organización se empeñan en llegar al consenso. De hecho, una vez adquirido, el consenso es invocado para hacer que se adopten convenciones internacionales que adquieren fuerza de ley en los Estados que las ratifican. Un sistema de derecho internacional positivo Ese es el núcleo del problema colocado por la globalización según la ONU. A través de sus convenciones o de sus tratados normativos, esta organización está dispuesta a articular un sistema de derecho supra-estatal, puramente positivo, que lleva una fuerte influencia de Kelsen (7). El objeto del derecho no es más la justicia sino la ley. Una tendencia fundamental se observa cada vez más: las normas de los derechos estatales no son válidas si no son validadas por el derecho supra-estatal. Como Kelsen anticipara en su célebre Teoría pura, el poder de la ONU se concentra de manera piramidal. Todos, individuos o Estados deben obedecer la norma fundamental surgida de la voluntad de aquellos que definen el derecho internacional. Dicho derecho internacional puramente positivo, libre de toda referencia a la declaración de 1948, es el instrumento utilizado por la ONU para imponer al mundo la visión de la globalización que debería permitirle colocarse como superestado. Un tribunal penal internacional Al controlar el derecho --colocándose, de manera definitiva, como la única fuente del derecho y pudiendo a todo momento verificar si ese derecho es respetado por las instancias ejecutivas--, la ONU entroniza un sistema de pensamiento único. Se constituye entonces un tribunal tallado para su sed de poder. De esta manera, crímenes contra los «nuevos derechos» del hombre podrían ser juzgados por la Corte Penal Internacional, fundada en Roma en 1998. Por ejemplo, en el caso en que el aborto no fuera legalizado en un determinado Estado, este último podría ser excluido de la «sociedad global»; en el caso en que un grupo religioso se opusiese a la homosexualidad, o a la eutanasia, dicho grupo podría ser condenado por la Corte Penal Internacional por atentar contra los «nuevos derechos humanos». La «gobernancia» global Estamos, por lo tanto, frente a un proyecto gigantesco, que ambiciona realizar la utopía de Kelsen, con el objeto de «legitimar» y montar un gobierno mundial único, en el cual las agencias de la ONU podrían transformarse en ministerios. Es urgente --nos aseguran-- crear un nuevo orden mundial, político y legal, y es preciso apurarse para encontrar los fondos para ejecutar el proyecto. Dicha gobernancia mundial ya fue desarrollada en el informe del PNUD de 1994. El texto, escrito ha pedido del PNUD por Jean Tinbergen, premio Nobel de economía (1969), evidencia ser un documento encomendado por y para la ONU. Citamos a continuación algunos extractos.8 Los problemas de la humanidad ya no pueden ser más resueltos por los gobiernos nacionales. De lo que necesitamos es de un gobierno mundial. La mejor manera de conseguirlo es reforzar el sistema de las Naciones Unidas. En ciertos casos eso significaría la necesidad de cambiar el papel de las agencias de las Naciones Unidas, que de consultivas pasarían a ser ejecutivas. Así, por ejemplo, la FAO se transformaría en el Ministerio Mundial de la Agricultura; UNIDO se tornaría en el Ministerio Mundial de la Industria, e ILO en el Ministerio Mundial de Asuntos Sociales. En otros casos, serían necesarias instituciones completamente nuevas. Estas podrían incluir, por ejemplo una Policía Mundial permanente que podría citar naciones a comparecer delante de la Corte Internacional de Justicia, o delante de otras Cortes especialmente creadas. Si dichas naciones no respetan las decisiones de la Corte, sería posible aplicar sanciones, tanto militares como no militares. Sin duda, cuando cumplen bien su papel, los Estados protegen a sus ciudadanos, se esfuerzan en hacer respetar los derechos del hombre y utilizan para ese fin los recursos apropiados. Actualmente, en los ambientes de la ONU, la destrucción de las naciones aparece como indispensable para alcanzar el objetivo de extinguir definitivamente la concepción antropocéntrica de los derechos humanos. Eliminando ese cuerpo intermediario que es el Estado nacional, además de debilitar la sociedad civil, se eliminaría la subsidiaridad pues sería constituido un Estado centralizado. El camino estaría abierto para la llegada de los tecnócratas globalizantes y otros aspirantes a la «gobernancia» mundial. Reafirmar el principio de subsidiaridad En efecto, el derecho internacional positivo es el instrumento utilizado por la ONU para organizar la sociedad mundial global. Bajo el disfraz de la globalización, la ONU organiza en su beneficio la «gobernancia» mundial. Bajo el disfraz de «responsabilidad compartida», ella invita a los Estados a limitar su justa soberanía. La ONU globaliza presentándose cada vez más como un superestado mundial. Tiende a gobernar todas las dimensiones de la vida, del pensamiento y de las actividades humanas, ejerciendo un control cada vez más centralizado de la información, del conocimiento y de las técnicas; de la alimentación, de la salud y de las poblaciones; de los recursos del suelo y del subsuelo; del comercio mundial y de las organizaciones sindicales; en fin y sobre todo de la política y del derecho. Exaltando el culto neopagano a la Madre-Tierra, priva al hombre del lugar central que le reconocen las grandes tradiciones filosóficas, jurídicas, políticas y religiosas. Delante de esta globalización construida sobre cimientos de arena, es preciso reafirmar la necesidad y la urgencia de fundar la sociedad internacional en el reconocimiento de la igual dignidad de todas las personas. El sistema jurídico que predomina en la ONU torna dicho reconocimiento estrictamente imposible, pues hace que el derecho y los derechos del hombre surjan de determinaciones voluntarias. Es preciso, por lo tanto, reafirmar la primacía del principio de subsidiaridad tal como debe ser correctamente comprendido. Esto significa que las organizaciones internacionales no pueden expoliar a los Estados, ni a los cuerpos intermedios ni en particular a la familia, de sus competencias naturales y de sus derechos, sino que, al contrario, deben ayudar a ejercerlos. La Iglesia no puede dejar de oponerse a dicha globalización, que implica una concentración de poder que exhala totalitarismo. Delante de una «globalización» imposible, que la ONU se esmera en imponer alegando un «consenso» siempre precario, la Iglesia debe aparecer, semejante a Cristo, como señal de división (9) No puede endosar ni una «unidad» ni una «universalidad» que estuvieran encima de las voluntades subjetivas de los individuos o impuestas por alguna instancia pública o privada. Frente al surgimiento de un nuevo Leviatán, no podemos permanecer callados ni inactivos ni indiferentes. ·- ·-· -··· ···-· Michel Schooyans Notas: (1) Para una discusión más amplia de los temas abordados en esta comunicación, referirse a nuestro libro La face cachée de l'ONU, Paris, Editions Le Sarment/Fayard, 2000. (2) Ver a ese propósito, HARDT Michael y NEGRI Antonio, Empire, Cambridge, Massachussets, Harvard University Press, 2000. (3) BRZEZINSKI Zbigniev, Between two ages. America's Role in the Technetronic Era, Harmondswot, Penguin Book Ltd., 1970. (4) Cfr. North-South: A Programme for Survival, Londres, Pan Books World Affairs, 1980, especialmente el capítulo 16, págs. 257-266. (5) Entre los primeros teóricos modernos de esa concepción, podemos mencionar Francisco de Vitoria (con su interpretación de la destinación universal de los bienes) y Hugo Grotius (con su doctrina de la libertad de navegación). (6) Fue en esa ocasión que la Congregación para la Doctrina de la Fe publicó su declaración Dominus Iesus. (7) Cfr. KELSEN Hans, Théorie pure du droit, traducción para el francés de Charles Eisennman, Paris, LGDJ, 1999. (8) Dicho texto se encuentra en Human Development Report 1994, publicado por el PNUD, New York Oxford, 1991, la cita está en la pág. 88. (9) Cfr. Lc 2, 33s; 12, 51-53; 21, 12-19; Mt 10, 34-36; 23; 31s; Jn 1, 6; 1 Jn 3, 22-4, 6. . |
sábado, 14 de abril de 2012
La ONU y la globalización
http://www.arbil.org/100schoo.htm
Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Fifth Edition, Revised, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978, pp. 4-15
Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Fifth Edition, Revised, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978, pp. 4-15
SIX PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL REALISM
1.Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. In order to improve society it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives. The operation of these laws being impervious to our preferences, men will challenge them only at the risk of failure.
Realism, believing as it does in the objectivity of the laws of politics, must also believe in the possibility of developing a rational theory that reflects, however imperfectly and one-sidedly, these objective laws. It believes also, then, in the possibility of distinguishing in politics between truth and opinion-between what is true objectively and rationally, supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only a subjective judgment, divorced from the facts as they are and informed by prejudice and wishful thinking.
Human nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavored to discover these laws. Hence, novelty is not necessarily a virtue in political theory, nor is old age a defect. The fact that a theory of politics, if there be such a theory, has never been heard of before tends to create a presumption against, rather than in favor of, its soundness. Conversely, the fact that a theory of politics was developed hundreds or even thousands of years ag~as was the theory of the balance of power-does not create a presumption that it must be outmoded and obsolete. A theory of politics must be subjected to the dual test of reason and experience. To dismiss such a theory because it had its flowering in centuries past is to present not a rational argument but a modernistic prejudice that takes for granted the superiority of the present over the past. To dispose of the revival of such a theory as a "fashion" or "fad" is tantamount to assuming that in matters political we can have opinions but no truths.
For realism, theory consists in ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through reason. It assumes that the character of a foreign policy can be ascertained only through the examination of the political acts performed and of the foreseeable consequences of these acts. Thus we can find out what statesmen have actually done, and from the foreseeable consequences of their acts we can surmise what their objectives might have been.
Yet examination of the facts is not enough. To give meaning to the factual raw material of foreign policy, we must approach political reality with a kind of rational outline, a map that suggests to us the possible meanings of foreign policy. In other words, we put ourselves in the position of a statesman who must meet a certain problem of foreign policy under certain circumstances, and we ask ourselves what the rational alternatives are from which a statesman may choose who must meet this problem under these circumstances (presuming always that he acts in a rational manner), and which of these rational alternatives this particular statesman, acting under these circumstances, is likely to choose. It is the testing of this rational hypothesis against the actual facts and their consequences that gives theoretical meaning to the facts of international politics.
2. The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. This concept provides the link between reason trying to understand international politics and the facts to be understood. It sets politics as an autonomous sphere of action and understanding apart from other spheres, such as economics (understood in terms of interest defined as wealth), ethics, aesthetics, or religion. Without such a concept a theory of politics, international or domestic, would be altogether impossible, for without it we could not distinguish between political and nonpolitical facts, nor could we bring at least a measure of systematic order to the political sphere.
We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power, and the evidence of history bears that assumption out. That assumption allows us to retrace and anticipate, as it were, the steps a statesman--past, present, or future--has taken or will take on the political scene. We look over his shoulder when he writes his dispatches; we listen in on his conversation with other statesmen; we read and anticipate his very thoughts. Thinking in terms of interest defined as power, we think as he does, and as disinterested observers we understand his thoughts and actions perhaps better than he, the actor on the political scene, does himself.
The concept of interest defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible. On the side of the actor, it provides for rational discipline in action and creates that astounding continuity in foreign policy which makes American, British, or Russian foreign policy appear as an intelligible, rational continuum, by and large consistent within itself, regardless of the different motives, preferences, and intellectual and moral qualities of successive statesmen. A realist theory of international politics, then, will guard against two popular fallacies: the concern with motives and the concern with ideological preferences.
To search for the clue to foreign policy exclusively in the motives of statesmen is both futile and deceptive. It is futile because motives are the most illusive of psychological data, distorted as they are, frequently beyond recognition, by the interests and emotions of actor and observer alike. Do we really know what our own motives are? And what do we know of the motives of others?
Yet even if we had access to the real motives of statesmen, that knowledge would help us little in understanding foreign policies, and might well lead us astray. It is true that the knowledge of the statesman's motives may give us one among many clues as to what the direction of his foreign policy might be. It cannot give us, however, the one clue by which to predict his foreign policies. History shows no exact and necessary correlation between the quality of motives and the quality of foreign policy. This is true in both moral and political terms.
We cannot conclude from the good intentions of a statesman that his foreign policies will be either morally praiseworthy or politically successful. Judging his motives, we can say that he will not intentionally pursue policies that are morally wrong, but we can say nothing about the probability of their success. If we want to know the moral and political qualities of his actions, we must know them, not his motives. How often have statesmen been motivated by the desire to improve the world, and ended by making it worse? And how often have they sought one goal, and ended by achieving something they neither expected nor desired?
Neville Chamberlain's politics of appeasement were, as far as we can judge, inspired by good motives; he was probably less motivated by considerations of personal power than were many other British prime ministers, and he sought to preserve peace and to assure the happiness of all concerned. Yet his policies helped to make the Second World War inevitable, and to bring untold miseries to millions of men. Sir Winston Churchill's motives, on the other hand, were much less universal in scope and much more narrowly directed toward personal and national power, yet the foreign policies that sprang from these inferior motives were certainly superior in moral and political quality to those pursued by his predecessor. Judged by his motives, Robespierre was one of the most virtuous men who ever lived. Yet it was the utopian radicalism of that very virtue that made him kill those less virtuous than himself, brought him to the scaffold, and destroyed the revolution of which he was a leader.
Good motives give assurance against deliberately bad policies; they do not guarantee the moral goodness and political success of the policies they inspire. What is important to know, if one wants to understand foreign policy, is not primarily the motives of a statesman, but his intellectual ability to comprehend the essentials of foreign policy, as well as his political ability to translate what he has comprehended into successful political action. It follows that while ethics in the abstract judges the moral qualities of motives, political theory must judge the political qualities of intellect, will, and action.
A realist theory of international politics will also avoid the other popular fallacy of equating the foreign policies of a statesman with his philosophic or political sympathies, and of deducing the former from the latter. Statesmen, especially under contemporary conditions, may well make a habit of presenting their foreign policies in terms of their philosophic and political sympathies in order to gain popular support for them. Yet they will distinguish with Lincoln between their "official duty," which is to think and act in terms of the national interest, and their "personal wish," which is to see their own moral values and political principles realized throughout the world. Political realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference to political ideals and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible-between what is desirable everywhere and at all times and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place.
It stands to reason that not all foreign policies have always followed so rational, objective, and unemotional a course. The contingent elements of personality, prejudice, and subjective preference, and of all the weaknesses of intellect and will which flesh is heir to, are bound to deflect foreign policies from their rational course. Especially where foreign policy is conducted under the conditions of democratic control, the need to marshal popular emotions to the support of foreign policy cannot fail to impair the rationality of foreign policy itself. Yet a theory of foreign policy which aims at rationality must for the time being, as it were, abstract from these irrational elements and seek to paint a picture of foreign policy which presents the rational essence to be found in experience, without the contingent deviations from rationality which are also found in experience.
Deviations from rationality which are not the result of the personal whim or the personal psychopathology of the policy maker may appear contingent only from the vantage point of rationality, but may themselves be elements in a coherent system of irrationality. The conduct of the Indochina War by the United States suggests that possibility. It is a question worth looking into whether modern psychology and psychiatry have provided us with the conceptual tools which would enable us to construct, as it were, a counter-theory of irrational politics, a kind of pathology of international politics.
The experience of the Indochina War suggests five factors such a theory might encompass: the imposition upon the empirical world of a simplistic and a priori picture of the world derived from folklore and ideological assumption, that is, the replacement of experience with superstition; the refusal to correct this picture of the world in the light of experience; the persistence in a foreign policy derived from the misperception of reality and the use of intelligence for the purpose not of adapting policy to reality but of reinterpreting reality to fit policy; the egotism of the policy makers widening the gap between perception and policy, on the one hand, and reality, on the other; finally, the urge to close the gap at least subjectively by action, any kind of action, that creates the illusion of mastery over a recalcitrant reality. According to the Wall Street Journal of April 3, 1970, "the desire to 'do something' pervades top levels of Government and may overpower other 'common sense' advice that insists the U.S. ability to shape events is negligible. The yen for action could lead to bold policy as therapy."
The difference between international politics as it actually is and a rational theory derived from it is like the difference between a photograph and a painted portrait. The photograph shows everything that can be seen by the naked eye; the painted portrait does not show everything that can be seen by the naked eye, but it shows, or at least seeks to show, one thing that the naked eye cannot see: the human essence of the person portrayed.
Political realism contains not only a theoretical but also a normative element. It knows that political reality is replete with contingencies and systemic irrationalities and points to the typical influences they exert upon foreign policy. Yet it shares with all social theory the need, for the sake of theoretical understanding, to stress the rational elements of political reality; for it is these rational elements that make reality intelligible for theory. Political realism presents the theoretical construct of a rational foreign policy which experience can never completely achieve.
At the same time political realism considers a rational foreign policy to be good foreign policy; for only a rational foreign policy minimizes risks and maximizes benefits and, hence, complies both with the moral precept of prudence and the political requirement of success. Political realism wants the photographic picture of the political world to resemble as much as possible its painted portrait. Aware of the inevitable gap between good—that is, rational—foreign policy and foreign policy as it actually is, political realism maintains not only that theory must focus upon the rational elements of political reality, but also that foreign policy ought to be rational in view of its own moral and practical purposes.
Hence, it is no argument against the theory here presented that actual foreign policy does not or cannot live up to it. That argument misunderstands the intention of this book, which is to present not an indiscriminate description of political reality, but a rational theory of international politics. Far from being invalidated by the fact that, for instance, a perfect balance of power policy will scarcely be found in reality, it assumes that reality, being deficient in this respect, must be understood and evaluated as an approximation to an ideal system of balance of power.
3. Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all. The idea of interest is indeed of the essence of politics and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place. Thucydides' statement, born of the experiences of ancient Greece, that "identity of interests is the surest of bonds whether between states or individuals" was taken up in the nineteenth century by Lord Salisbury's remark that "the only bond of union that endures" among nations is "the absence of all clashing interests." It was erected into a general principle of government by George Washington:
It was echoed and enlarged upon in our century by Max Weber's observation:A small knowledge of human nature will convince us, that, with far the greatest part of mankind, interest is the governing principle; and that almost every man is more or less, under its influence. Motives of public virtue may for a time, or in particular instances, actuate men to the observance of a conduct purely disinterested; but they are not of themselves sufficient to produce persevering conformity to the refined dictates and obligations of social duty. Few men are capable of making a continual sacrifice of all views of private interest, or advantage, to the common good. It is vain to exclaim against the depravity of human nature on this account; the fact is so, the experience of every age and nation has proved it and we must in a great measure, change the constitution of man, before we can make it otherwise. No institution, not built on the presumptive truth of these maxims can succeed.
Yet the kind of interest determining political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated. The goals that might be pursued by nations in their foreign policy can run the whole gamut of objectives any nation has ever pursued or might possibly pursue.Interests (material and ideal), not ideas, dominate directly the actions of men. Yet the "images of the world" created by these ideas have very often served as switches determining the tracks on which the dynamism of interests kept actions moving.
The same observations apply to the concept of power. Its content and the manner of its use are determined by the political and cultural environment. Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man. Thus power covers all social relationships which serve that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another. Power covers the domination of man by man, both when it is disciplined by moral ends and controlled by constitutional safeguards, as in Western democracies, and when it is that untamed and barbaric force which finds its laws in nothing but its own strength and its sole justification in its aggrandizement.
Political realism does not assume that the contemporary conditions under which foreign policy operates, with their extreme instability and the ever present threat of large-scale violence, cannot be changed. The balance of power, for instance, is indeed a perennial element of all pluralistic societies, as the authors of The Federalist papers well knew; yet it is capable of operating, as it does in the United States, under the conditions of relative stability and peaceful conflict. If the factors that have given rise to these conditions can be duplicated on the international scene, similar conditions of stability and peace will then prevail there, as they have over long stretches of history among certain nations.
What is true of the general character of international relations is also true of the nation state as the ultimate point of reference of contemporary foreign policy. While the realist indeed believes that interest is the perennial standard by which political action must be judged and directed, the contemporary connection between interest and the nation state is a product of history, and is therefore bound to disappear in the course of history. Nothing in the realist position militates against the assumption that the present division of the political world into nation states will be replaced by larger units of a quite different character, more in keeping with the technical potentialities and the moral requirements of the contemporary world.
The realist parts company with other schools of thought before the all-important question of how the contemporary world is to be transformed. The realist is persuaded that this transformation can be achieved only through the workmanlike manipulation of the perennial forces that have shaped the past as they will the future. The realist cannot be persuaded that we can bring about that transformation by confronting a political reality that has its own laws with an abstract ideal that refuses to take those laws into account.
4. Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. It is also aware of the ineluctable tension between the moral command and the requirements of successful political action. And it is unwilling to gloss over and obliterate that tension and thus to obfuscate both the moral and the political issue by making it appear as though the stark facts of politics were morally more satisfying than they actually are, and the moral law less exacting than it actually is.
Realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but that they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place. The individual may say for himself: "Fiat justitia, pereat mundus (Let justice be done, even if the world perish)," but the state has no right to say so in the name of those who are in its care. Both individual and state must judge political action by universal moral principles, such as that of liberty. Yet while the individual has a moral right to sacrifice himself in defense of such a moral principle, the state has no right to let its moral disapprobation of the infringement of liberty get in the way of successful political action, itself inspired by the moral principle of national survival. There can be no political morality without prudence; that is, without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action. Realism, then, considers prudence-the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions-to be the supreme virtue in politics. Ethics in the abstract judges action by its conformity with the moral law; political ethics judges action by its political consequences. Classical and medieval philosophy knew this, and so did Lincoln when he said:
5. Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. As it distinguishes between truth and opinion, so it distinguishes between truth and idolatry. All nations are tempted-and few have been able to resist the temptation for long-to clothe their own particular aspirations and actions in the moral purposes of the universe. To know that nations are subject to the moral law is one thing, while to pretend to know with certainty what is good and evil in the relations among nations is quite another. There is a world of difference between the belief that all nations stand under the judgment of God, inscrutable to the human mind, and the blasphemous conviction that God is always on one's side and that what one wills oneself cannot fail to be willed by God also.I do the very best I know how, the very best I can, and I mean to keep doing so until the end. If the end brings me out all right, what is said against me won't amount to anything. If the end brings me out wrong, ten angels swearing I was right would make no difference.
The lighthearted equation between a particular nationalism and the counsels of Providence is morally indefensible, for it is that very sin of pride against which the Greek tragedians and the Biblical prophets have warned rulers and ruled. That equation is also politically pernicious, for it is liable to engender the distortion in judgment which, in the blindness of crusading frenzy, destroys nations and civilizations-in the name of moral principle, ideal, or God himself.
On the other hand, it is exactly the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves us from both that moral excess and that political folly. For if we look at all nations, our own included, as political entities pursuing their respective interests defined in terms of power, we are able to do justice to all of them. And we are able to do justice to all of them in a dual sense: We are able to judge other nations as we judge our own and, having judged them in this fashion, we are then capable of pursuing policies that respect the interests of other nations, while protecting and promoting those of our own. Moderation in policy cannot fail to reflect the moderation of moral judgment.
6. The difference, then, between political realism and other schools of thought is real, and it is profound. However much the theory of political realism may have been misunderstood and misinterpreted, there is no gainsaying its distinctive intellectual and moral attitude to matters political.
Intellectually, the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere, as the economist, the lawyer, the moralist maintain theirs. He thinks in terms of interest defined as power, as the economist thinks in terms of interest defined as wealth; the lawyer, of the conformity of action with legal rules; the moralist, of the conformity of action with moral principles. The economist asks: "How does this policy affect the wealth of society, or a segment of it?" The lawyer asks: "Is this policy in accord with the rules of law?" The moralist asks: "Is this policy in accord with moral principles?" And the political realist asks: "How does this policy affect the power of the nation?" (Or of the federal government, of Congress, of the party, of agriculture, as the case may be.)
The political realist is not unaware of the existence and relevance of standards of thought other than political ones. As political realist, he cannot but subordinate these other standards to those of politics. And he parts company with other schools when they impose standards of thought appropriate to other spheres upon the political sphere. It is here that political realism takes issue with the "legalistic-moralistic approach" to international politics. That this issue is not, as has been contended, a mere figment of the imagination, but goes to the very core of the controversy, can be shown from many historical examples. Three will suffice to make the point.3
In 1939 the Soviet Union attacked Finland. This action confronted France and Great Britain with two issues, one legal, the other political. Did that action violate the Covenant of the League of Nations and, if it did, what countermeasures should France and Great Britain take? The legal question could easily be answered in the affirmative, for obviously the Soviet Union had done what was prohibited by the Covenant. The answer to the political question depends, first, upon the manner in which the Russian action affected the interests of France and Great Britain; second, upon the existing distribution of power between France and Great Britain, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and other potentially hostile nations, especially Germany, on the other; and, third, upon the influence that the countermeasures were likely to have upon the interests of France and Great Britain and the future distribution of power. France and Great Britain, as the leading members of the League of Nations, saw to it that the Soviet Union was expelled from the League, and they were prevented from joining Finland in the war against the Soviet Union only by Sweden's refusal to allow their troops to pass through Swedish territory on their way to Finland. If this refusal by Sweden had not saved them, France and Great Britain would shortly have found themselves at war with the Soviet Union and Germany at the same time.
The policy of France and Great Britain was a classic example of legalism in that they allowed the answer to the legal question, legitimate within its sphere, to determine their political actions. Instead of asking both questions, that of law and that of power, they asked only the question of law; and the answer they received could have no bearing on the issue that their very existence might have depended upon.
The second example illustrates the "moralistic approach" to international politics. It concerns the international status of the Communist government of China. The rise of that government confronted the Western world with two issues, one moral, the other political. Were the nature and policies of that government in accord with the moral principles of the Western world? Should the Western world deal with such a government? The answer to the first question could not fail to be in the negative. Yet it did not follow with necessity that the answer to the second question should also be in the negative. The standard of thought applied to the first--the moral question—was simply to test the nature and the policies of the Communist government of China by the principles of Western morality. On the other hand, the second—the political question—had to be subjected to the complicated test of the interests involved and the power available on either side, and of the bearing of one or the other course of action upon these interests and power. The application of this test could well have led to the conclusion that it would be wiser not to deal with the Communist government of China. To arrive at this conclusion by neglecting this test altogether and answering the political question in terms of the moral issue was indeed a classic example of the "moralistic approach" to international politics.
The third case illustrates strikingly the contrast between realism and the legalistic-moralistic approach to foreign policy. Great Britain, as one of the guarantors of the neutrality of Belgium, went to war with Germany in August 1914 because Germany had violated the neutrality of Belgium. The British action could be justified either in realistic or legalistic-moralistic terms. That is to say, one could argue realistically that for centuries it had -been axiomatic for British foreign policy to prevent the control of the Low Countries by a hostile power. It was then not so much the violation of Belgium's neutrality per se as the hostile intentions of the violator which provided the rationale for British intervention. If the violator had been another nation but Germany, Great Britain might well have refrained from intervening. This is the position taken by Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary during that period. Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs Hardinge remarked to him in 1908: "If France violated Belgian neutrality in a war against Germany, it is doubtful whether England or Russia would move a finger to maintain Belgian neutrality, while if the neutrality of Belgium was violated by Germany, it is probable that the converse would be the case." Whereupon Sir Edward Grey replied: "This is to the point." Yet one could also take the legalistic and moralistic position that the violation of Belgium's neutrality per se, because of its legal and moral defects and regardless of the interests at stake and of the identity of the violator, justified British and, for that matter, American intervention. This was the position which Theodore Roosevelt took in his letter to Sir Edward Grey of January 22, 1915:
This realist defense of the autonomy of the political sphere against its subversion by other modes of thought does not imply disregard for the existence and importance of these other modes of thought. It rather implies that each should be assigned its proper sphere and function. Political realism is based upon a pluralistic conception of human nature. Real man is a composite of "economic man," "political man," "moral man," "religious man," etc. A man who was nothing but "political man" would be a beast, for he would be completely lacking in moral restraints. A man who was nothing but "moral man" would be a fool, for he would be completely lacking in prudence. A man who was nothing but "religious man" would be a saint, for he would be completely lacking in worldly desires.To me the crux of the situation has been Belgium. If England or France had acted toward Belgium as Germany has acted I should have opposed them, exactly as I now oppose Germany. I have emphatically approved your action as a model for what should be done by those who believe that treaties should be observed in good faith and that there is such a thing as international morality. I take this position as an American who is no more an Englishman than he is a German, who endeavors loyally to serve the interests of his own country, but who also endeavors to do what he can for justice and decency as regards mankind at large, and who therefore feels obliged to judge all other nations by their conduct on any given occasion.
Recognizing that these different facets of human nature exist, political realism also recognizes that in order to understand one of them one has to deal with it on its own terms. That is to say, if I want to understand "religious man," I must for the time being abstract from the other aspects of human nature and deal with its religious aspect as if it were the only one. Furthermore, I must apply to the religious sphere the standards of thought appropriate to it, always remaining aware of the existence of other standards and their actual influence upon the religious qualities of man. What is true of this facet of human nature is true of all the others. No modern economist, for instance, would conceive of his science and its relations to other sciences of man in any other way. It is exactly through such a process of emancipation from other standards of thought, and the development of one appropriate to its subject matter, that economics has developed as an autonomous theory of the economic activities of man. To contribute to a similar development in the field of politics is indeed the purpose of political realism.
It is in the nature of things that a theory of politics which is based upon such principles will not meet with unanimous approval-nor does, for that matter, such a foreign policy. For theory and policy alike run counter to two trends in our culture which are not able to reconcile themselves to the assumptions and results of a rational, objective theory of politics. One of these trends disparages the role of power in society on grounds that stem from the experience and philosophy of the nineteenth century; we shall address ourselves to this tendency later in greater detail.4 The other trend, opposed to the realist theory and practice of politics, stems from the very relationship that exists, and must exist, between the human mind and the political sphere. For reasons that we shall discuss later5 the human mind in its day-by-day operations cannot bear to look the truth of politics straight in the face. It must disguise, distort, belittle, and embellish the truth-the more so, the more the individual is actively involved in the processes of politics, and particularly in those of international politics. For only by deceiving himself about the nature of politics and the role he plays on the political scene is man able to live contentedly as a political animal with himself and his fellow men.
Thus it is inevitable that a theory which tries to understand international politics as it actually is and as it ought to be in view of its intrinsic nature, rather than as people would like to see it, must overcome a psychological resistance that most other branches of learning need not face. A book devoted to the theoretical understanding of international politics therefore requires a special explanation and justification.
lunes, 13 de febrero de 2012
THE FUTURE WE WANT: rio +20
UNITED NATIONS
January 10, 2012
THE FUTURE WE WANT 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS Paras
I. Preamble/Stage setting
Vision…………………………………………………………………. 1-5
II. Renewing Political Commitment
A.
Reaffirming Rio principles and past action plans………………… 6-9
B.
Assessing the progress to date and the remaining gaps in the
implementation of the outcomes of the major summits on
sustainable development and addressing new and emerging
challenges (Integration, Implementation, Coherence)……………… 10-16
C.
Engaging major groups…………………………………………….. 17-21
D.
Framework for action………………………………………………. 22-24
III. Green Economy in the context of sustainable development and
poverty eradication
A.
Framing the context of the green economy, challenges and
opportunities……………………………………………………. 25-31
B.
Toolkits and experience sharing………………………………… 32-36
C.
Framework for action…………………………………………… 37-43
IV. Institutional Framework for Sustainable Development
A.
Strengthening/reforming/integrating the three pillars…………… 44
B.
GA, ECOSOC, CSD, SDC proposal……………………………. 45-49
C.
UNEP, specialized agency on environment proposal, IFIs,
United Nations operational activities at country level………… 50-58
1 Submitted by the co-Chairs on behalf of the Bureau in accordance with the decision in Prepcom 2 to present the zero-draft of the outcome document for consideration by Member States and other stakeholders no later than early January 2012.
2
D.
Regional, National, Local……………………………………… 59-62
V. Framework for action and follow-up
A. Priority/key/thematic/cross-sectoral issues and areas…………… 63-104
B. Accelerating and measuring progress (SDGs, GDP and others)... 105-111
C.
Means of Implementation (finance, access to and transfer of
technology, capacity building)………………………………….. 112-128
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I. Preamble/Stage Setting
1. We, the heads of State and Government, having met at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from 20-22 June 2012, resolve to work together for a prosperous, secure and sustainable future for our people and our planet.
2. We reaffirm our determination to free humanity from hunger and want through the eradication of all forms of poverty and strive for societies which are just, equitable and inclusive, for economic stability and growth that benefits all.
3. We are committed to making every effort to accelerate progress in achieving the internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals by 2015, thus improving the lives of the poorest people.
4. We are also committed to enhancing cooperation and addressing the ongoing and emerging issues in ways which will enhance opportunities for all, be centred on human development while preserving and protecting the life support system of our common home, our shared planet.
5. We urge bold and decisive action on the objective and themes for the conference. We renew our commitment to sustainable development and express our determination to pursue the green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication. We further affirm our resolve to strengthen the institutional framework for sustainable development. Taken together our actions should fill the implementation gaps and achieve greater integration among the three pillars of sustainable development – the economic, the social and the environmental.
II. Renewing Political Commitment
[A. Reaffirming Rio principles and past action plans]
6. We reaffirm that we continue to be guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with full respect for international law and its principles.
7. We reaffirm our commitment to advance progress in implementation of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, the Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21, the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development and the Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, the Barbados Programme of Action and the Mauritius Strategy for Implementation. The Rio Principles shall continue to guide the international community and serve as the basis for cooperation, coherence and implementation of agreed commitments.
8. We also reaffirm our commitment to the Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development, the Doha Declaration on Financing for Development: the Political Declaration on Africa’s development needs, and the Istanbul Programme of Action for Least Developed Countries.
9. We recognize the need to reinforce sustainable development globally through our collective and national efforts, in accordance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and the principle of the sovereign right of states over their natural resources.
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[B. Assessing the progress to date and the remaining gaps in the implementation of the outcomes of the major summits on sustainable development and addressing new and emerging challenges (Integration, Implementation, Coherence)]
10. We recognize that the twenty years since the Earth Summit in 1992 have seen progress and change. There are deeply inspiring examples of progress, including in poverty eradication, in pockets of economic dynamism and in connectivity spurred by new information technologies which have empowered people.
11. We acknowledge, however, that there have also been setbacks because of multiple interrelated crises – financial, economic and volatile energy and food prices. Food insecurity, climate change and biodiversity loss have adversely affected development gains. New scientific evidence points to the gravity of the threats we face. New and emerging challenges include the further intensification of earlier problems calling for more urgent responses. We are deeply concerned that around 1.4 billion people still live in extreme poverty and one sixth of the world’s population is undernourished, pandemics and epidemics are omnipresent threats. Unsustainable development has increased the stress on the earth's limited natural resources and on the carrying capacity of ecosystems. Our planet supports seven billion people expected to reach nine billion by 2050.
12. We note that national commitment to sustainable development has deepened. Many Governments now incorporate environmental and social issues into their economic policies, and have strengthened their commitment to sustainable development and the implementation of Agenda 21 and related agreements through national policies and plans, national legislation and institutions, and the ratification and implementation of international environmental agreements.
13. We nevertheless observe that, despite efforts by Governments and non-State actors in all countries, sustainable development remains a distant goal and there remain major barriers and systemic gaps in the implementation of internationally agreed commitments.
14. We resolve to redouble our efforts to eradicate poverty and hunger and to ensure that human activities respect the earth’s ecosystems and life-support systems. We need to mainstream sustainable development in all aspects of the way we live. We acknowledge the particular responsibility to nurture sustainable development and sustainable consumption and production patterns.
15. We recognize the special challenges facing least developed countries, landlocked developing countries, Small Island developing States, middle-income countries and African countries.
16. We acknowledge the diversity of the world and recognize that all cultures and civilizations contribute to the enrichment of humankind and the protection of the Earth’s life support system. We emphasize the importance of culture for sustainable development. We call for a holistic approach to sustainable development which will guide humanity to live in harmony with nature.
[C. Engaging major groups]
17. We underscore that a fundamental prerequisite for the achievement of sustainable development is broad public participation in decision-making. Sustainable development requires major groups – women, children and youth, indigenous peoples, non-governmental
5
organisations, local authorities, workers and trade unions, business and industry, the scientific and technological community, and farmers – to play a meaningful role at all levels. It is important to enable all members of civil society to be actively engaged in sustainable development by incorporating their specific knowledge and practical know-how into national and local policy making. In this regard, we also acknowledge the role of national parliaments in furthering sustainable development.
18. We recognize that improved participation of civil society depends upon strengthening the right to access information and building civil society capacity to exercise this right. Technology is making it easier for Governments to share information with the public and for the public to hold decision makers accountable. In this regard, it is essential to work towards universal access to information and communications technologies.
19. We acknowledge the important role of the private sector in moving towards sustainable development. We strongly encourage business and industry to show leadership in advancing a green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication.
20. We also acknowledge the essential role of local governments and the need to fully integrate them into all levels of decision making on sustainable development.
21. We recognize the importance of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the global, regional and national implementation of sustainable development strategies. We also recognize the need to reflect the views of children and youth as the issues we are addressing will have a deep impact on the youth of today and the generations that follow.
[D. Framework for action]
22. We commit to improving governance and capacity at all levels – global, regional, national and local – to promote integrated decision making, to fill the implementation gap and promote coherence across institutions.
23. We commit ourselves to reinvigorating the global partnership for sustainable development. We recognize that States must work together cooperatively and join with all stakeholders to address the common sustainable development challenges we face.
24. We call for a global policy framework requiring all listed and large private companies to consider sustainability issues and to integrate sustainability information within the reporting cycle.
III. Green Economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication
A.
Framing the context of the green economy, challenges and opportunities
25. We are convinced that a green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication should contribute to meeting key goals – in particular the priorities of poverty eradication, food security, sound water management, universal access to modern energy services, sustainable cities, management of oceans and improving resilience and disaster preparedness, as well as public health, human resource development and sustained, inclusive and equitable growth that generates employment, including for youth. It should be
6
based on the Rio principles, in particular the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, and should be people-centred and inclusive, providing opportunities and benefits for all citizens and all countries.
26. We view the green economy as a means to achieve sustainable development, which must remain our overarching goal. We acknowledge that a green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication should protect and enhance the natural resource base, increase resource efficiency, promote sustainable consumption and production patterns, and move the world toward low-carbon development.
27. We underscore that green economy is not intended as a rigid set of rules but rather as a decision-making framework to foster integrated consideration of the three pillars of sustainable development in all relevant domains of public and private decision-making.
28. We recognize that each country, respecting specific realities of economic, social and environmental development as well as particular conditions and priorities, will make the appropriate choices.
29. We are convinced that green economy policies and measures can offer win-win opportunities to improve the integration of economic development with environmental sustainability to all countries, regardless of the structure of their economy and their level of development.
30. We acknowledge, however, that developing countries are facing great challenges in eradicating poverty and sustaining growth, and a transition to a green economy will require structural adjustments which may involve additional costs to their economies. In this regard, the support of the international community is necessary.
31. We note that the transformation to a green economy should be an opportunity to all countries and a threat to none. We therefore resolve that international efforts to help countries build a green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication must not:
a)
create new trade barriers;
b)
impose new conditionalities on aid and finance;
c)
widen technology gaps or exacerbate technological dependence of developing countries on developed countries;
d)
restrict the policy space for countries to pursue their own paths to sustainable development.
B.
Toolkits and experience sharing
32. We acknowledge that countries are still in the early stages of building green economies and can learn from one another. We note the positive experiences in developing a green economy in some countries, including developing countries. We recognize that a mix of policies and measures tailored to each country’s needs and preferences will be needed. Policy options include, inter alia, regulatory, economic and fiscal instruments, investment in green infrastructure, financial incentives, subsidy reform, sustainable public procurement, information disclosure, and voluntary partnerships.
7
33. We support the creation of an international knowledge-sharing platform to facilitate countries’ green economy policy design and implementation, including:
a)
a menu of policy options;
b)
a toolbox of good practices in applying green economy policies at regional, national and local levels;
c)
a set of indicators to measure progress;
d)
a directory of technical services, technology and financing that could assist developing countries.
34. We request the UN Secretary-General, in consultation with international organizations, relevant entities of the UN system and others, to establish such a platform.
35. We urge member States to make national presentations on their experiences in the appropriate institutional framework as described in Section IV below.
36. We also urge all major groups, particularly business and industry, to share their experiences in this regard.
C.
Framework for action
37. We recognize the value of having a set of differentiated strategies, tailored to the needs of different countries and different sectors.
38. We encourage all States to develop their own green economy strategies through a transparent process of multi-stakeholder consultation.
39. We encourage the United Nations, in cooperation with other relevant international organizations, to support developing countries at their request in developing green economy strategies.
40. We strongly encourage business and industry – organized by industrial sectors, cooperating across countries and in consultation with governments, workers and trade unions and other stakeholders – to develop green economy roadmaps for their respective sectors, with concrete goals and benchmarks of progress, including for net creation of jobs.
41. We acknowledge and encourage voluntary national commitments and actions by State actors as well as stakeholders to achieve a green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication, including through the shaping of innovative partnerships.
42. We realize that to make significant progress towards building green economies will require new investments, new skills formation, technology development, transfer and access, and capacity building in all countries. We acknowledge the particular need to provide support to developing countries in this regard and agree:
a)
To provide new, additional and scaled up sources of financing to developing countries;
b)
To launch an international process to promote the role of innovative instruments of finance for building green economies;
8
c)
To gradually eliminate subsidies that have considerable negative effects on the environment and are incompatible with sustainable development, complemented with measures to protect poor and vulnerable groups;
d)
To facilitate international collaborative research on green technologies involving developing countries, ensuring the technologies so developed remain in the public domain and are accessible to developing countries at affordable prices;
e)
To encourage creation of Centres of Excellence as nodal points for green technology R&D;
f)
To support developing countries’ scientists and engineers and scientific and engineering institutions to foster their efforts to develop green local technologies and use traditional knowledge;
g)
To establish a capacity development scheme to provide country-specific advice and, where appropriate, region and sector-specific advice to all interested countries and to assist them in accessing available funds.
43. We recognize the importance of measuring global progress. In this regard, we will be guided by a roadmap that contains the following indicative goals and timeline:
a)
2012~2015: establishment of indicators and measures to evaluate implementation; establishment of mechanisms for the transfer of technology, sharing of know-how, and enhancement of capacities;
b)
2015~2030: implementation and periodic assessment of progress;
c)
2030: comprehensive assessment of progress.
We request the Secretary-General, in close cooperation with the UN system, to provide a report for the General Assembly at its 67th session, detailing further steps in this regard.
IV. Institutional framework for sustainable development
A. Strengthening/reforming/integrating the three pillars
44. We recognize that strong governance at local, national, regional and global levels is critical for advancing sustainable development. The strengthening and reform of the institutional framework should, among other things:
a)
Integrate the three pillars of sustainable development and promote the implementation of Agenda 21 and related outcomes, consistent with the principles of universality, democracy, transparency, cost-effectiveness and accountability, keeping in mind the Rio Principles, in particular common but differentiated responsibilities.
b)
Provide cohesive, government-driven policy guidance on sustainable development and identify specific actions in order to fulfil the sustainable development agenda through the promotion of integrated decision making at all levels.
c)
Monitor progress in the implementation of Agenda 21 and relevant outcomes and agreements, at local, national, regional and global levels.
d)
Reinforce coherence among the agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations system, including the International Financial and Trade Institutions.
9
B. GA, ECOSOC, CSD, SDC proposal
[General Assembly]
45. We reaffirm the central role of the General Assembly as the highest policy-making body, and call for it to further integrate sustainable development as a key element of the overarching framework for United Nations activities.
[Economic and Social Council]
46. We reaffirm that the Economic and Social Council is a central mechanism for the coordination of the United Nations system and its specialized agencies and supervision of its subsidiary bodies, in particular its functional commissions.
47. We also reaffirm that ECOSOC is a central forum for intergovernmental deliberations on economic and social issues, and provides guidance and coordination to the UN system’s operational activities for development in the field.
48. We agree to promote the role of ECOSOC in the integration of the three pillars of sustainable development including by making better use of the coordination segment of ECOSOC for monitoring implementation of agreements on sustainable development and, similarly, making use of the ECOSOC operational activities and humanitarian segments to promote mainstreaming of sustainable development into programmes of UN agencies and programmes.
[Commission on Sustainable Development]
49. We reaffirm the role of the Commission on Sustainable Development as the high level commission on sustainable development in the United Nations system. We agree to consider options for improving the working methods, the agenda and programme of work of the Commission to better facilitate, promote, and coordinate sustainable development implementation, including measures to ensure more focused, balanced and responsive engagement with a more limited set of issues, and enhanced implementation of its decisions. We also agree to consider means to enhance the review function of the Commission, including through a voluntary review process.
OR
[Sustainable Development Council]
49 alt. We resolve to transform the CSD into a Sustainable Development Council that will serve as the authoritative, high-level body for consideration of matters relating to the integration of the three dimensions of sustainable development
49 alt. bis The work of the Council should be based on fundamental documents on sustainable development such as Agenda 21, the Rio principles and related outcomes. The Council should, inter alia, fully carry out the functions and mandates of the Commission for Sustainable Development. It would be guided by the need to promote integration of the three pillars of sustainable development, promote effective implementation at all levels and promote effective institutional coherence. It should help in enhancing the involvement of all stakeholders, particularly major groups, in the follow-up of Rio+20.
49 alt ter. We request the President of the General Assembly to conduct open, transparent and inclusive negotiations, with the aim of establishing the mandate, modalities, functions, size, composition, membership, working methods and procedures of the Council and report on the outcome before the end of the 67th session of the General Assembly.
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C. UNEP, specialized agency on environment proposal, IFIs, United Nations operational activities at country level
50. We reaffirm the need to strengthen international environmental governance within the context of the institutional framework for sustainable development, in order to promote a balanced integration of the economic, social and environmental pillars of sustainable development, and to this end:
51. We agree to strengthen the capacity of UNEP to fulfil its mandate by establishing universal membership in its Governing Council and call for significantly increasing its financial base to deepen policy coordination and enhance means of implementation.
OR
51 alt. We resolve to establish a UN specialized agency for the environment with universal membership of its Governing Council, based on UNEP, with a revised and strengthened mandate, supported by stable, adequate and predictable financial contributions and operating on an equal footing with other UN specialized agencies. This agency, based in Nairobi, would cooperate closely with other specialized agencies.
52. We stress the need for a regular review of the state of the planet and the Earth’s carrying capacity and request the Secretary-General to coordinate the preparation of such a review in consultation with relevant international organizations and the UN system.
53. We call for the scientific basis for decision making to be strengthened across the UN system and recognise that the interface between science and policy-making should be enhanced.
54. We recognize that sustainable development must be given due consideration by the International Financial Institutions, especially the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the regional development banks, UNCTAD and the World Trade Organization in regulating global trade. In that regard, we request the international financial institutions to review their programmatic strategies to ensure the provision of better support to developing countries for the implementation of sustainable development.
55. We recognize that coordination and cooperation among the MEAs are needed in order to, inter alia, address policy fragmentation and avoid overlap and duplication. We welcome the work already undertaken to enhance synergies among the three conventions in the chemicals and waste cluster. We call for further measures to enhance coordination and cooperation among MEAs in other clusters.
56. We emphasise the need to strengthen operational activities for sustainable development, especially the delivery of the UN system in the field.
57. We agree to further consider the establishment of an Ombudsperson, or High Commissioner for Future Generations, to promote sustainable development.
58. We agree to take steps to give further effect to Rio Principle 10 at the global, regional and national level, as appropriate.
D. Regional, national, local
59. We reaffirm that overarching sustainable development strategies incorporated in national development plans are key instruments for the implementation of sustainable development commitments at regional, national and sub-national levels.
11
60. We call for the strengthening of existing regional and sub-regional mechanisms, including the regional commissions, in promoting sustainable development through capacity building, exchange of information and experiences and providing expertise.
61. We underline the need for more coherent and integrated planning and decision-making at the national level. We therefore call on countries to establish and strengthen, as appropriate, national sustainable development councils to enable them to coordinate, consolidate and ensure the mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues in the highest decision-making bodies, with the integration and full participation of all stakeholders.
62. We recognise the need to integrate sustainable urban development policy as a key component of a national sustainable development policy and, in this regard, to empower local authorities to work more closely with national governments. We recognize that partnerships among cities have emerged as a leading force for action on sustainable development. We commit to support international cooperation among local authorities, including through assistance from international organizations.
V. Framework for action and follow-up
A. Priority/key/thematic/cross-sectoral issues and areas
63. We recognize that progress in implementation requires attention to a number of sectoral and cross-sectoral priority areas as well as to the linkage among different sectors. We also recognize that assessing progress in these areas can benefit from defining aspirational goals, targets and indicators, as appropriate. We therefore commit to the following actions:
[Food security]
64. We reaffirm the right to food and call upon all States to prioritize sustainable intensification of food production through increased investment in local food production, improved access to local and global agri-food markets, and reduced waste throughout the supply chain, with special attention to women, smallholders, youth, and indigenous farmers. We are committed to ensuring proper nutrition for our people.
65. We call for more transparent and open trading systems and, where appropriate, practices that contribute to the stability of food prices and domestic markets; ensure access to land, water and other resources; and support social protection programmes.
66. We further support initiatives at all levels that improve access to information, enhance interactions among farmers and experts through education and extension services, and increase the use of appropriate technologies for sustainable agriculture.
[Water]
67. We underline the importance of the right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation as a human right that is essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights. Furthermore, we highlight the critical importance of water resources for sustainable development, including poverty and hunger eradication, public health, food security, hydropower, agriculture and rural development.
68. We recognize the necessity of setting goals for wastewater management, including reducing water pollution from households, industrial and agricultural sources and promoting
12
water efficiency, wastewater treatment and the use of wastewater as a resource, particularly in expanding urban areas.
69. We renew our commitment made in the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (JPOI) regarding the development and implementation of integrated water resources management and water efficiency plans. We reaffirm our commitment to the 2005-2015 International Decade for Action “Water for Life”. We encourage cooperation initiatives for water resources management in particular through capacity development, exchange of experiences, best practices and lessons learned, as well as sharing appropriate environmentally sound technologies and know-how.
[Energy]
70. We propose to build on the Sustainable Energy for All initiative launched by the Secretary-General, with the goals of providing universal access to a basic minimum level of modern energy services for both consumption and production uses by 2030; improving energy efficiency at all levels with a view to doubling the rate of improvement by 2030; and doubling the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix by 2030 through promoting the development and use of renewable energy sources and technologies in all countries. We call for provision of adequate financial resources, of sufficient quality and delivered in a timely manner, to developing countries for providing efficient and wider use of energy sources.
71. We agree that each country should work for low-carbon development. We encourage more widespread use of energy planning tools to provide a robust framework for donors and partners to coordinate their development cooperation efforts.
[Cities]
72. We commit to promote an integrated and holistic approach to planning and building sustainable cities through support to local authorities, efficient transportation and communication networks, greener buildings and an efficient human settlements and service delivery system, improved air and water quality, reduced waste, improved disaster preparedness and response and increased climate resilience.
[Green jobs-social inclusion]
73. We recognize that the development of human capacity is essential to achieving broad-based economic growth, building strong, sustainable communities, promoting social well-being, and improving the environment. Workers must have the skills and protections necessary to participate in and benefit from the transition to a green economy, which has great potential to create decent jobs, particularly for the youth, and eradicate poverty.
74. We also recognize that significant job creation opportunities can be availed through investments in public works for restoration and enhancement of natural capital, sustainable land and water management practices, family farming, ecological farming, organic production systems, sustainable forest management, rational use of biodiversity for economic purposes, and new markets linked to renewable and unconventional energy sources. We encourage business and industry to contribute to green job creation throughout their global supply chains, including through support to small and medium enterprises.
75. We recognise and acknowledge that social well being and growth are also built on robust and high quality infrastructure that creates jobs and wealth, adds long term value and
13
allows for broad inclusion. In this regard, we commit to enhanced infrastructure investment which promotes sustainable development.
76. Understanding that building green economies will depend critically on creating green jobs, we agree to take the following measures:
a)
improve knowledge of green jobs trends and developments, and integrate relevant data into national economic statistics;
b)
address potential skills shortages through skills mapping and promoting of green jobs training programs;
c)
put in place an enabling environment for robust creation of decent jobs by private enterprises investing in the green economy, including by small and medium enterprises.
77. We stress the need to provide social protection to all members of society, including those who are not employed in the formal economy. In this regard, we strongly encourage national and local initiatives aimed at providing a social protection floor for all citizens.
[Oceans and Seas, SIDS]
78. We recognize that oceans are critical to sustaining Earth’s life support systems. Careless exploitation of the oceans and their resources puts at risk the ability of oceans to continue to provide food, other economic benefits and environmental services to humankind. We stress the importance of the conservation, sustainable management and equitable sharing of marine and ocean resources. We also recognize the significant economic, social and environmental contribution of coral reefs to island and coastal States, and support cooperation based on the Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI), and the International Coral Reef Initiative (ICRI).
79. We endorse the Regular Process for the Global Marine Assessment as a credible, robust process, and support the completion of its first global integrated assessment of the state of the marine environment by 2014. We call for consideration of assessment findings in formulation of national, regional and global oceans policy.
80. We note the establishment by the UN General Assembly of an Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to study issues relating to the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction, and we agree to initiate, as soon as possible, the negotiation of an implementing agreement to UNCLOS that would address the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction.
81. We call on countries to advance implementation of the Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-based Activities, including further capacity-building and mobilization of resources for investment in treatment of human wastes and waste water and to develop a global action plan to combat marine litter and pollution.
82. We also propose to implement an international observing network for ocean acidification and to work collectively to prevent further ocean acidification.
83. We note that despite agreement to restore global fish stocks to sustainable levels by 2015, many stocks continue to be depleted unsustainably. We call upon States to re-commit
14
to maintaining or restoring depleted fish stocks to sustainable levels and to further commit to implementing science-based management plans to rebuild stocks by 2015.
84. We urge countries to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing by adopting and implementing effective tools, in accordance with international law. We note the agreement on port state measures to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing approved by FAO in 2009 and urge States that have not yet acceded to the agreement to do so.
85. We reaffirm that Small Island Developing States (SIDS) remain a special case for sustainable development in view of their unique and particular vulnerabilities. The vulnerability of SIDS has worsened over the last two decades, primarily because of higher exposure to external shocks, including increasing adverse impacts of climate change and more frequent and intense natural disasters as well as the fuel, food, and financial crises, combined with inadequate international support.
86. We call for increased efforts to assist SIDS in implementing the BPOA and MSI and achieving sustainable development, including improvement and strengthening of the relevant entities within the United Nations system that support SIDS' sustainable development. We also call for the convening of the third international conference for the sustainable development of Small Island Developing States in 2014.
[Natural disasters]
87. We reiterate the call for disaster risk reduction to continue to be addressed in the context of sustainable development and placed within the post-2015 development agenda. We call for increased coordination among national, regional and international levels for a robust response to environmental emergencies and improved forecasting and early warning systems, as well as closer coordination between emergency response, early recovery and development efforts, including adoption of a post “Hyogo Framework” and its integration into development policy.
[Climate change]
88. We reaffirm that climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time, and express our deep concern that developing countries are particularly vulnerable to and are experiencing increased negative impacts from climate change, which is severely undermining food security and efforts to eradicate poverty, and also threatens the territorial integrity, viability and the very existence of small island developing states. We welcome the outcome of COP17 at Durban and look forward to the urgent implementation of all the agreements reached.
89. We encourage international initiatives and partnerships to address the interrelationship among water, energy, food and climate change in order to achieve synergies as well as to minimize conflicts among policy objectives, being particularly sensitive to impacts on vulnerable populations.
[Forests and biodiversity]
90. We support policy frameworks and market instruments that effectively slow, halt and reverse deforestation and forest degradation and promote the sustainable use and management of forests, as well as their conservation and restoration. We call for the urgent implementation of the “Non-Legally Binding Instrument on all Types of Forests (NLBI)”.
15
91. We welcome the Nagoya Protocol adopted at the tenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biodiversity. We support mainstreaming of biodiversity and ecosystem services in policies and decision-making processes at international, regional and national levels, and encourage investments in natural capital through appropriate incentives and policies, which support a sustainable and equitable use of biological diversity and ecosystems.
[Land degradation and desertification]
92. We recognize the economic and social significance of land, particularly its contribution to growth, food security, and poverty eradication, and note that the intensity of desertification of most of Africa’s arable land is a serious challenge to sustainable development in the region. We call for enhanced support by the international community to the implementation of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD).
93. We agree to support partnerships and initiatives for the safeguarding of soil resources such as the Global Soil Partnership (GSP). We also encourage scientific studies and initiatives aimed at raising wider awareness of the economic benefits of sustainable land management policies that achieve healthy and productive land and soil.
[Mountains]
94. We recognize that mountains are highly vulnerable to global changes such as climate change, and are often home to communities including of indigenous peoples, who have developed sustainable uses of their resources yet are often marginalized, sometimes with high poverty rates, exposure to natural risks and food insecurity. We recognize the benefits derived from mountains and their associated ecosystems. We also recognize the need to explore global, regional, national, and local mechanisms to compensate and reward mountain communities for the services they provide through ecosystem protection.
[Chemicals and waste]
95. We call for strengthening the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management (SAICM), to step up efforts towards a more robust, coherent, effective and efficient international regime for chemicals throughout their lifecycle. Sustainable and adequate long-term funding will be important to assist developing countries with sound chemical and waste management through an integrated approach.
96. We commend the increased coordination and cooperation among the Basel Convention, the Rotterdam Convention and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, and call for public-private partnerships aiming to enhance capacity and technology for environmentally sound waste management. We also note with concern the emerging challenges of electronic waste and plastics in the marine environment, which should be addressed inter alia through appropriate programmes and environmentally sound technologies for material and energy recovery.
[Sustainable Consumption and Production]
97. We agree to establish a 10-Year Framework of Programmes on sustainable consumption and production (SCP) as part of a global pact on sustainable consumption and production, based on the text elaborated in the negotiations in the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development at its nineteenth session.
16
[Education]
98. We recognize that access by all people to quality education is an essential condition for sustainable development and social inclusion. We commit to strengthening the contribution of our education systems to the pursuit of sustainable development, including through enhanced teacher training and curricula development.
99. We call upon universities to become models of best practice and transformation by setting an example of sustainability of facilities on their campuses and teaching sustainable development as a module across all disciplines. In this way sustainable practices will become embedded in learning and action.
100. We encourage international education exchange activities on education for sustainable development, including the creation of fellowships and scholarships for international study in disciplines and inter-disciplinary fields pertinent to the promotion of sustainable development.
101. We agree to promote education for sustainable development beyond the end of the United Nations Decade of Education for Sustainable Development in 2014, to educate a new generation of students in the values, key disciplines and holistic, cross-disciplinary approaches essential to promoting sustainable development.
[Gender equality]
102. We recognize that sustainable development is linked to and depends on women’s economic contributions, both formal and informal. We note with concern that persistent social and economic inequities continue to affect women and children, who make up the majority of those living in poverty.
103. We call for removing barriers that have prevented women from being full participants in the economy and unlocking their potential as drivers of sustainable development, and agree to prioritize measures to promote gender equality in all spheres of our societies, including education, employment, ownership of resources, access to justice, political representation, institutional decision-making, care giving and household and community management.
104. We support the work of UN Women in achieving gender equality and the empowerment of women in all aspects of life and bringing greater attention to the linkages between gender equality and the promotion of sustainable development.
B.
Accelerating and measuring progress
105. We recognize that goals, targets and milestones are essential for measuring and accelerating progress towards sustainable development and agree to launch an inclusive process to devise by 2015:
a)
a set of global Sustainable Development Goals that reflect an integrated and balanced treatment of the three dimensions of sustainable development, are consistent with the principles of Agenda 21, and are universal and applicable to all countries but allowing for differentiated approaches among countries;
b)
a mechanism for periodic follow-up and reporting on progress made toward their achievement.
17
106. We invite all stakeholders to join this process and request the UN Secretary-General to coordinate this process.
107. We propose that the Sustainable Development Goals could include sustainable consumption and production patterns as well as priority areas such as oceans; food security and sustainable agriculture; sustainable energy for all; water access and efficiency; sustainable cities; green jobs, decent work and social inclusion; and disaster risk reduction and resilience.
108. We consider that the Sustainable Development Goals should complement and strengthen the MDGs in the development agenda for the post-2015 period, with a view to establishing a set of goals in 2015 which are part of the post-2015 UN Development Agenda.
109. We also propose that progress towards these Goals should be measured by appropriate indicators and evaluated by specific targets to be achieved possibly by 2030, and request the Secretary-General for proposals in this regard.
110. We resolve to strengthen the capacity of all countries to collect and analyze data and information needed to support the monitoring of progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals. We request the Secretary-General, with the support of interested donors, the UN system, international organizations and other entities, to promote a global partnership in this regard.
111. We also recognize the limitations of GDP as a measure of well-being. We agree to further develop and strengthen indicators complementing GDP that integrate economic, social and environmental dimensions in a balanced manner. We request the Secretary-General to establish a process in consultation with the UN system and other relevant organizations.
C.
Means of implementation
[Finance]
112. We call for the fulfilment of all official development assistance commitments, including the commitments by many developed countries to achieve the target of 0.7 per cent of gross national product for official development assistance to developing countries by 2015, as well as a target of 0.15 to 0.20 per cent of gross national product for official development assistance to least developed countries. To reach their agreed timetables, donor countries should take all necessary and appropriate measures to raise the rate of aid disbursements to meet their existing commitments. We urge those developed countries that have not yet done so to make additional concrete efforts towards the target of 0.7 per cent of gross national product for official development assistance to developing countries, including the specific target of 0.15 to 0.20 per cent of gross national product for official development assistance to least developed countries in line with the Istanbul Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the decade 2011-2020 in accordance with their commitments.
113. We call for the prioritization of sustainable development in the allocation of resources in line with the priorities and needs of developing countries, and for substantial increases in the provision of financing to developing countries for sustainable development.
114. We call for increased aid effectiveness, taking into account the Paris Declaration, the Accra Action Agenda and the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation in
18
ensuring that aid is effective, accountable and responsive to the needs and priorities of developing countries. There is a need for greater coherence at both the international and national levels, including effective oversight of resources to ensure that developing countries have steady and predictable access to adequate financing, including by the private sector, to promote sustainable development.
115. We welcome the ongoing efforts to strengthen and support South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation. We stress that South-South cooperation is not a substitute for, but rather a complement to, North-South cooperation. We also stress that triangular cooperation should be further utilized as an effective modality for development cooperation.
116. We reaffirm the key role of the private sector in promoting sustainable development including through multi-stakeholder partnerships. Public policy should create a stable investment climate and regulatory framework conducive to long-term investment and socially and environmentally responsible behaviour by business and industry.
117. We call for the Global Environment Facility to be strengthened, with regularity in funding flows and reform of governance processes towards more transparent and democratic systems. We urge simplification of procedures and assistance to the least developed countries and SIDS in accessing resources from the GEF.
[Science and Technology]
118. We reaffirm the commitments related to science and technology contained in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Agenda 21 and in the outcomes of other major United Nations Summits and Conferences.
119. We recognize the importance of strengthening the scientific, technological and innovation capacities of countries to promote sustainable development. In this regard, we stress the need for effective mechanisms, enhanced means, appropriate enabling environments, and the removal of obstacles to the scaling up of the development and transfer of technology to developing countries.
120. We agree to strengthen international cooperation conducive to investment and technology transfer, development and diffusion.
[Capacity Building]
121. We reaffirm the need for providing support to existing regional and sub-regional structures and mechanisms in developing countries and encouraging their creation, where needed, with the aim of facilitating cooperation and the exchange of information, including capacity building, exchange of experiences and expertise to advance the implementation of the decisions at regional and sub regional levels.
122. We call for the immediate implementation of the Bali Strategic Plan for Technology Support and Capacity Building.
123. We urge the participation and representation of scientists from developing countries in processes related to global environmental and sustainable development assessment to strengthen scientific capacities in these countries.
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[Trade]
124. We urge the members of the WTO to redouble efforts to achieve a universal, rules-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system and for an early balanced, ambitious and development-oriented outcome of the Doha Development Round of multilateral trade negotiations. We call for the full realization of the commitments made in the 2005 Hong-Kong Ministerial Declaration of the WTO in favour of the least developed countries.
125. We reaffirm that there is an urgent need for the international economic and financial institutions to work together to ensure that developing countries, particularly the least developed countries, are able to benefit from the advantages of the multilateral trade system and their integration into global markets.
126. We support the eventual phase out of market distorting and environmentally harmful subsidies that impede the transition to sustainable development, including those on fossil fuels, agriculture and fisheries, with safeguards to protect vulnerable groups.
127. We support the trade capacity building and facilitation activities of international and regional organizations which would assist developing countries, particularly the least developed countries, in identifying and seizing new export opportunities, including those created by the transition towards a green economy.
[Registry/compendium of commitments]
128. We welcome the voluntary commitments made at Rio+20 and invite the Secretary-General to compile them in a registry/compendium that will serve as an accountability framework.
January 10, 2012
THE FUTURE WE WANT 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS Paras
I. Preamble/Stage setting
Vision…………………………………………………………………. 1-5
II. Renewing Political Commitment
A.
Reaffirming Rio principles and past action plans………………… 6-9
B.
Assessing the progress to date and the remaining gaps in the
implementation of the outcomes of the major summits on
sustainable development and addressing new and emerging
challenges (Integration, Implementation, Coherence)……………… 10-16
C.
Engaging major groups…………………………………………….. 17-21
D.
Framework for action………………………………………………. 22-24
III. Green Economy in the context of sustainable development and
poverty eradication
A.
Framing the context of the green economy, challenges and
opportunities……………………………………………………. 25-31
B.
Toolkits and experience sharing………………………………… 32-36
C.
Framework for action…………………………………………… 37-43
IV. Institutional Framework for Sustainable Development
A.
Strengthening/reforming/integrating the three pillars…………… 44
B.
GA, ECOSOC, CSD, SDC proposal……………………………. 45-49
C.
UNEP, specialized agency on environment proposal, IFIs,
United Nations operational activities at country level………… 50-58
1 Submitted by the co-Chairs on behalf of the Bureau in accordance with the decision in Prepcom 2 to present the zero-draft of the outcome document for consideration by Member States and other stakeholders no later than early January 2012.
2
D.
Regional, National, Local……………………………………… 59-62
V. Framework for action and follow-up
A. Priority/key/thematic/cross-sectoral issues and areas…………… 63-104
B. Accelerating and measuring progress (SDGs, GDP and others)... 105-111
C.
Means of Implementation (finance, access to and transfer of
technology, capacity building)………………………………….. 112-128
3
I. Preamble/Stage Setting
1. We, the heads of State and Government, having met at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from 20-22 June 2012, resolve to work together for a prosperous, secure and sustainable future for our people and our planet.
2. We reaffirm our determination to free humanity from hunger and want through the eradication of all forms of poverty and strive for societies which are just, equitable and inclusive, for economic stability and growth that benefits all.
3. We are committed to making every effort to accelerate progress in achieving the internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals by 2015, thus improving the lives of the poorest people.
4. We are also committed to enhancing cooperation and addressing the ongoing and emerging issues in ways which will enhance opportunities for all, be centred on human development while preserving and protecting the life support system of our common home, our shared planet.
5. We urge bold and decisive action on the objective and themes for the conference. We renew our commitment to sustainable development and express our determination to pursue the green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication. We further affirm our resolve to strengthen the institutional framework for sustainable development. Taken together our actions should fill the implementation gaps and achieve greater integration among the three pillars of sustainable development – the economic, the social and the environmental.
II. Renewing Political Commitment
[A. Reaffirming Rio principles and past action plans]
6. We reaffirm that we continue to be guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with full respect for international law and its principles.
7. We reaffirm our commitment to advance progress in implementation of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, the Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21, the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development and the Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, the Barbados Programme of Action and the Mauritius Strategy for Implementation. The Rio Principles shall continue to guide the international community and serve as the basis for cooperation, coherence and implementation of agreed commitments.
8. We also reaffirm our commitment to the Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development, the Doha Declaration on Financing for Development: the Political Declaration on Africa’s development needs, and the Istanbul Programme of Action for Least Developed Countries.
9. We recognize the need to reinforce sustainable development globally through our collective and national efforts, in accordance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and the principle of the sovereign right of states over their natural resources.
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[B. Assessing the progress to date and the remaining gaps in the implementation of the outcomes of the major summits on sustainable development and addressing new and emerging challenges (Integration, Implementation, Coherence)]
10. We recognize that the twenty years since the Earth Summit in 1992 have seen progress and change. There are deeply inspiring examples of progress, including in poverty eradication, in pockets of economic dynamism and in connectivity spurred by new information technologies which have empowered people.
11. We acknowledge, however, that there have also been setbacks because of multiple interrelated crises – financial, economic and volatile energy and food prices. Food insecurity, climate change and biodiversity loss have adversely affected development gains. New scientific evidence points to the gravity of the threats we face. New and emerging challenges include the further intensification of earlier problems calling for more urgent responses. We are deeply concerned that around 1.4 billion people still live in extreme poverty and one sixth of the world’s population is undernourished, pandemics and epidemics are omnipresent threats. Unsustainable development has increased the stress on the earth's limited natural resources and on the carrying capacity of ecosystems. Our planet supports seven billion people expected to reach nine billion by 2050.
12. We note that national commitment to sustainable development has deepened. Many Governments now incorporate environmental and social issues into their economic policies, and have strengthened their commitment to sustainable development and the implementation of Agenda 21 and related agreements through national policies and plans, national legislation and institutions, and the ratification and implementation of international environmental agreements.
13. We nevertheless observe that, despite efforts by Governments and non-State actors in all countries, sustainable development remains a distant goal and there remain major barriers and systemic gaps in the implementation of internationally agreed commitments.
14. We resolve to redouble our efforts to eradicate poverty and hunger and to ensure that human activities respect the earth’s ecosystems and life-support systems. We need to mainstream sustainable development in all aspects of the way we live. We acknowledge the particular responsibility to nurture sustainable development and sustainable consumption and production patterns.
15. We recognize the special challenges facing least developed countries, landlocked developing countries, Small Island developing States, middle-income countries and African countries.
16. We acknowledge the diversity of the world and recognize that all cultures and civilizations contribute to the enrichment of humankind and the protection of the Earth’s life support system. We emphasize the importance of culture for sustainable development. We call for a holistic approach to sustainable development which will guide humanity to live in harmony with nature.
[C. Engaging major groups]
17. We underscore that a fundamental prerequisite for the achievement of sustainable development is broad public participation in decision-making. Sustainable development requires major groups – women, children and youth, indigenous peoples, non-governmental
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organisations, local authorities, workers and trade unions, business and industry, the scientific and technological community, and farmers – to play a meaningful role at all levels. It is important to enable all members of civil society to be actively engaged in sustainable development by incorporating their specific knowledge and practical know-how into national and local policy making. In this regard, we also acknowledge the role of national parliaments in furthering sustainable development.
18. We recognize that improved participation of civil society depends upon strengthening the right to access information and building civil society capacity to exercise this right. Technology is making it easier for Governments to share information with the public and for the public to hold decision makers accountable. In this regard, it is essential to work towards universal access to information and communications technologies.
19. We acknowledge the important role of the private sector in moving towards sustainable development. We strongly encourage business and industry to show leadership in advancing a green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication.
20. We also acknowledge the essential role of local governments and the need to fully integrate them into all levels of decision making on sustainable development.
21. We recognize the importance of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the global, regional and national implementation of sustainable development strategies. We also recognize the need to reflect the views of children and youth as the issues we are addressing will have a deep impact on the youth of today and the generations that follow.
[D. Framework for action]
22. We commit to improving governance and capacity at all levels – global, regional, national and local – to promote integrated decision making, to fill the implementation gap and promote coherence across institutions.
23. We commit ourselves to reinvigorating the global partnership for sustainable development. We recognize that States must work together cooperatively and join with all stakeholders to address the common sustainable development challenges we face.
24. We call for a global policy framework requiring all listed and large private companies to consider sustainability issues and to integrate sustainability information within the reporting cycle.
III. Green Economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication
A.
Framing the context of the green economy, challenges and opportunities
25. We are convinced that a green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication should contribute to meeting key goals – in particular the priorities of poverty eradication, food security, sound water management, universal access to modern energy services, sustainable cities, management of oceans and improving resilience and disaster preparedness, as well as public health, human resource development and sustained, inclusive and equitable growth that generates employment, including for youth. It should be
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based on the Rio principles, in particular the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, and should be people-centred and inclusive, providing opportunities and benefits for all citizens and all countries.
26. We view the green economy as a means to achieve sustainable development, which must remain our overarching goal. We acknowledge that a green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication should protect and enhance the natural resource base, increase resource efficiency, promote sustainable consumption and production patterns, and move the world toward low-carbon development.
27. We underscore that green economy is not intended as a rigid set of rules but rather as a decision-making framework to foster integrated consideration of the three pillars of sustainable development in all relevant domains of public and private decision-making.
28. We recognize that each country, respecting specific realities of economic, social and environmental development as well as particular conditions and priorities, will make the appropriate choices.
29. We are convinced that green economy policies and measures can offer win-win opportunities to improve the integration of economic development with environmental sustainability to all countries, regardless of the structure of their economy and their level of development.
30. We acknowledge, however, that developing countries are facing great challenges in eradicating poverty and sustaining growth, and a transition to a green economy will require structural adjustments which may involve additional costs to their economies. In this regard, the support of the international community is necessary.
31. We note that the transformation to a green economy should be an opportunity to all countries and a threat to none. We therefore resolve that international efforts to help countries build a green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication must not:
a)
create new trade barriers;
b)
impose new conditionalities on aid and finance;
c)
widen technology gaps or exacerbate technological dependence of developing countries on developed countries;
d)
restrict the policy space for countries to pursue their own paths to sustainable development.
B.
Toolkits and experience sharing
32. We acknowledge that countries are still in the early stages of building green economies and can learn from one another. We note the positive experiences in developing a green economy in some countries, including developing countries. We recognize that a mix of policies and measures tailored to each country’s needs and preferences will be needed. Policy options include, inter alia, regulatory, economic and fiscal instruments, investment in green infrastructure, financial incentives, subsidy reform, sustainable public procurement, information disclosure, and voluntary partnerships.
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33. We support the creation of an international knowledge-sharing platform to facilitate countries’ green economy policy design and implementation, including:
a)
a menu of policy options;
b)
a toolbox of good practices in applying green economy policies at regional, national and local levels;
c)
a set of indicators to measure progress;
d)
a directory of technical services, technology and financing that could assist developing countries.
34. We request the UN Secretary-General, in consultation with international organizations, relevant entities of the UN system and others, to establish such a platform.
35. We urge member States to make national presentations on their experiences in the appropriate institutional framework as described in Section IV below.
36. We also urge all major groups, particularly business and industry, to share their experiences in this regard.
C.
Framework for action
37. We recognize the value of having a set of differentiated strategies, tailored to the needs of different countries and different sectors.
38. We encourage all States to develop their own green economy strategies through a transparent process of multi-stakeholder consultation.
39. We encourage the United Nations, in cooperation with other relevant international organizations, to support developing countries at their request in developing green economy strategies.
40. We strongly encourage business and industry – organized by industrial sectors, cooperating across countries and in consultation with governments, workers and trade unions and other stakeholders – to develop green economy roadmaps for their respective sectors, with concrete goals and benchmarks of progress, including for net creation of jobs.
41. We acknowledge and encourage voluntary national commitments and actions by State actors as well as stakeholders to achieve a green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication, including through the shaping of innovative partnerships.
42. We realize that to make significant progress towards building green economies will require new investments, new skills formation, technology development, transfer and access, and capacity building in all countries. We acknowledge the particular need to provide support to developing countries in this regard and agree:
a)
To provide new, additional and scaled up sources of financing to developing countries;
b)
To launch an international process to promote the role of innovative instruments of finance for building green economies;
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c)
To gradually eliminate subsidies that have considerable negative effects on the environment and are incompatible with sustainable development, complemented with measures to protect poor and vulnerable groups;
d)
To facilitate international collaborative research on green technologies involving developing countries, ensuring the technologies so developed remain in the public domain and are accessible to developing countries at affordable prices;
e)
To encourage creation of Centres of Excellence as nodal points for green technology R&D;
f)
To support developing countries’ scientists and engineers and scientific and engineering institutions to foster their efforts to develop green local technologies and use traditional knowledge;
g)
To establish a capacity development scheme to provide country-specific advice and, where appropriate, region and sector-specific advice to all interested countries and to assist them in accessing available funds.
43. We recognize the importance of measuring global progress. In this regard, we will be guided by a roadmap that contains the following indicative goals and timeline:
a)
2012~2015: establishment of indicators and measures to evaluate implementation; establishment of mechanisms for the transfer of technology, sharing of know-how, and enhancement of capacities;
b)
2015~2030: implementation and periodic assessment of progress;
c)
2030: comprehensive assessment of progress.
We request the Secretary-General, in close cooperation with the UN system, to provide a report for the General Assembly at its 67th session, detailing further steps in this regard.
IV. Institutional framework for sustainable development
A. Strengthening/reforming/integrating the three pillars
44. We recognize that strong governance at local, national, regional and global levels is critical for advancing sustainable development. The strengthening and reform of the institutional framework should, among other things:
a)
Integrate the three pillars of sustainable development and promote the implementation of Agenda 21 and related outcomes, consistent with the principles of universality, democracy, transparency, cost-effectiveness and accountability, keeping in mind the Rio Principles, in particular common but differentiated responsibilities.
b)
Provide cohesive, government-driven policy guidance on sustainable development and identify specific actions in order to fulfil the sustainable development agenda through the promotion of integrated decision making at all levels.
c)
Monitor progress in the implementation of Agenda 21 and relevant outcomes and agreements, at local, national, regional and global levels.
d)
Reinforce coherence among the agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations system, including the International Financial and Trade Institutions.
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B. GA, ECOSOC, CSD, SDC proposal
[General Assembly]
45. We reaffirm the central role of the General Assembly as the highest policy-making body, and call for it to further integrate sustainable development as a key element of the overarching framework for United Nations activities.
[Economic and Social Council]
46. We reaffirm that the Economic and Social Council is a central mechanism for the coordination of the United Nations system and its specialized agencies and supervision of its subsidiary bodies, in particular its functional commissions.
47. We also reaffirm that ECOSOC is a central forum for intergovernmental deliberations on economic and social issues, and provides guidance and coordination to the UN system’s operational activities for development in the field.
48. We agree to promote the role of ECOSOC in the integration of the three pillars of sustainable development including by making better use of the coordination segment of ECOSOC for monitoring implementation of agreements on sustainable development and, similarly, making use of the ECOSOC operational activities and humanitarian segments to promote mainstreaming of sustainable development into programmes of UN agencies and programmes.
[Commission on Sustainable Development]
49. We reaffirm the role of the Commission on Sustainable Development as the high level commission on sustainable development in the United Nations system. We agree to consider options for improving the working methods, the agenda and programme of work of the Commission to better facilitate, promote, and coordinate sustainable development implementation, including measures to ensure more focused, balanced and responsive engagement with a more limited set of issues, and enhanced implementation of its decisions. We also agree to consider means to enhance the review function of the Commission, including through a voluntary review process.
OR
[Sustainable Development Council]
49 alt. We resolve to transform the CSD into a Sustainable Development Council that will serve as the authoritative, high-level body for consideration of matters relating to the integration of the three dimensions of sustainable development
49 alt. bis The work of the Council should be based on fundamental documents on sustainable development such as Agenda 21, the Rio principles and related outcomes. The Council should, inter alia, fully carry out the functions and mandates of the Commission for Sustainable Development. It would be guided by the need to promote integration of the three pillars of sustainable development, promote effective implementation at all levels and promote effective institutional coherence. It should help in enhancing the involvement of all stakeholders, particularly major groups, in the follow-up of Rio+20.
49 alt ter. We request the President of the General Assembly to conduct open, transparent and inclusive negotiations, with the aim of establishing the mandate, modalities, functions, size, composition, membership, working methods and procedures of the Council and report on the outcome before the end of the 67th session of the General Assembly.
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C. UNEP, specialized agency on environment proposal, IFIs, United Nations operational activities at country level
50. We reaffirm the need to strengthen international environmental governance within the context of the institutional framework for sustainable development, in order to promote a balanced integration of the economic, social and environmental pillars of sustainable development, and to this end:
51. We agree to strengthen the capacity of UNEP to fulfil its mandate by establishing universal membership in its Governing Council and call for significantly increasing its financial base to deepen policy coordination and enhance means of implementation.
OR
51 alt. We resolve to establish a UN specialized agency for the environment with universal membership of its Governing Council, based on UNEP, with a revised and strengthened mandate, supported by stable, adequate and predictable financial contributions and operating on an equal footing with other UN specialized agencies. This agency, based in Nairobi, would cooperate closely with other specialized agencies.
52. We stress the need for a regular review of the state of the planet and the Earth’s carrying capacity and request the Secretary-General to coordinate the preparation of such a review in consultation with relevant international organizations and the UN system.
53. We call for the scientific basis for decision making to be strengthened across the UN system and recognise that the interface between science and policy-making should be enhanced.
54. We recognize that sustainable development must be given due consideration by the International Financial Institutions, especially the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the regional development banks, UNCTAD and the World Trade Organization in regulating global trade. In that regard, we request the international financial institutions to review their programmatic strategies to ensure the provision of better support to developing countries for the implementation of sustainable development.
55. We recognize that coordination and cooperation among the MEAs are needed in order to, inter alia, address policy fragmentation and avoid overlap and duplication. We welcome the work already undertaken to enhance synergies among the three conventions in the chemicals and waste cluster. We call for further measures to enhance coordination and cooperation among MEAs in other clusters.
56. We emphasise the need to strengthen operational activities for sustainable development, especially the delivery of the UN system in the field.
57. We agree to further consider the establishment of an Ombudsperson, or High Commissioner for Future Generations, to promote sustainable development.
58. We agree to take steps to give further effect to Rio Principle 10 at the global, regional and national level, as appropriate.
D. Regional, national, local
59. We reaffirm that overarching sustainable development strategies incorporated in national development plans are key instruments for the implementation of sustainable development commitments at regional, national and sub-national levels.
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60. We call for the strengthening of existing regional and sub-regional mechanisms, including the regional commissions, in promoting sustainable development through capacity building, exchange of information and experiences and providing expertise.
61. We underline the need for more coherent and integrated planning and decision-making at the national level. We therefore call on countries to establish and strengthen, as appropriate, national sustainable development councils to enable them to coordinate, consolidate and ensure the mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues in the highest decision-making bodies, with the integration and full participation of all stakeholders.
62. We recognise the need to integrate sustainable urban development policy as a key component of a national sustainable development policy and, in this regard, to empower local authorities to work more closely with national governments. We recognize that partnerships among cities have emerged as a leading force for action on sustainable development. We commit to support international cooperation among local authorities, including through assistance from international organizations.
V. Framework for action and follow-up
A. Priority/key/thematic/cross-sectoral issues and areas
63. We recognize that progress in implementation requires attention to a number of sectoral and cross-sectoral priority areas as well as to the linkage among different sectors. We also recognize that assessing progress in these areas can benefit from defining aspirational goals, targets and indicators, as appropriate. We therefore commit to the following actions:
[Food security]
64. We reaffirm the right to food and call upon all States to prioritize sustainable intensification of food production through increased investment in local food production, improved access to local and global agri-food markets, and reduced waste throughout the supply chain, with special attention to women, smallholders, youth, and indigenous farmers. We are committed to ensuring proper nutrition for our people.
65. We call for more transparent and open trading systems and, where appropriate, practices that contribute to the stability of food prices and domestic markets; ensure access to land, water and other resources; and support social protection programmes.
66. We further support initiatives at all levels that improve access to information, enhance interactions among farmers and experts through education and extension services, and increase the use of appropriate technologies for sustainable agriculture.
[Water]
67. We underline the importance of the right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation as a human right that is essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights. Furthermore, we highlight the critical importance of water resources for sustainable development, including poverty and hunger eradication, public health, food security, hydropower, agriculture and rural development.
68. We recognize the necessity of setting goals for wastewater management, including reducing water pollution from households, industrial and agricultural sources and promoting
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water efficiency, wastewater treatment and the use of wastewater as a resource, particularly in expanding urban areas.
69. We renew our commitment made in the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (JPOI) regarding the development and implementation of integrated water resources management and water efficiency plans. We reaffirm our commitment to the 2005-2015 International Decade for Action “Water for Life”. We encourage cooperation initiatives for water resources management in particular through capacity development, exchange of experiences, best practices and lessons learned, as well as sharing appropriate environmentally sound technologies and know-how.
[Energy]
70. We propose to build on the Sustainable Energy for All initiative launched by the Secretary-General, with the goals of providing universal access to a basic minimum level of modern energy services for both consumption and production uses by 2030; improving energy efficiency at all levels with a view to doubling the rate of improvement by 2030; and doubling the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix by 2030 through promoting the development and use of renewable energy sources and technologies in all countries. We call for provision of adequate financial resources, of sufficient quality and delivered in a timely manner, to developing countries for providing efficient and wider use of energy sources.
71. We agree that each country should work for low-carbon development. We encourage more widespread use of energy planning tools to provide a robust framework for donors and partners to coordinate their development cooperation efforts.
[Cities]
72. We commit to promote an integrated and holistic approach to planning and building sustainable cities through support to local authorities, efficient transportation and communication networks, greener buildings and an efficient human settlements and service delivery system, improved air and water quality, reduced waste, improved disaster preparedness and response and increased climate resilience.
[Green jobs-social inclusion]
73. We recognize that the development of human capacity is essential to achieving broad-based economic growth, building strong, sustainable communities, promoting social well-being, and improving the environment. Workers must have the skills and protections necessary to participate in and benefit from the transition to a green economy, which has great potential to create decent jobs, particularly for the youth, and eradicate poverty.
74. We also recognize that significant job creation opportunities can be availed through investments in public works for restoration and enhancement of natural capital, sustainable land and water management practices, family farming, ecological farming, organic production systems, sustainable forest management, rational use of biodiversity for economic purposes, and new markets linked to renewable and unconventional energy sources. We encourage business and industry to contribute to green job creation throughout their global supply chains, including through support to small and medium enterprises.
75. We recognise and acknowledge that social well being and growth are also built on robust and high quality infrastructure that creates jobs and wealth, adds long term value and
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allows for broad inclusion. In this regard, we commit to enhanced infrastructure investment which promotes sustainable development.
76. Understanding that building green economies will depend critically on creating green jobs, we agree to take the following measures:
a)
improve knowledge of green jobs trends and developments, and integrate relevant data into national economic statistics;
b)
address potential skills shortages through skills mapping and promoting of green jobs training programs;
c)
put in place an enabling environment for robust creation of decent jobs by private enterprises investing in the green economy, including by small and medium enterprises.
77. We stress the need to provide social protection to all members of society, including those who are not employed in the formal economy. In this regard, we strongly encourage national and local initiatives aimed at providing a social protection floor for all citizens.
[Oceans and Seas, SIDS]
78. We recognize that oceans are critical to sustaining Earth’s life support systems. Careless exploitation of the oceans and their resources puts at risk the ability of oceans to continue to provide food, other economic benefits and environmental services to humankind. We stress the importance of the conservation, sustainable management and equitable sharing of marine and ocean resources. We also recognize the significant economic, social and environmental contribution of coral reefs to island and coastal States, and support cooperation based on the Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI), and the International Coral Reef Initiative (ICRI).
79. We endorse the Regular Process for the Global Marine Assessment as a credible, robust process, and support the completion of its first global integrated assessment of the state of the marine environment by 2014. We call for consideration of assessment findings in formulation of national, regional and global oceans policy.
80. We note the establishment by the UN General Assembly of an Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to study issues relating to the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction, and we agree to initiate, as soon as possible, the negotiation of an implementing agreement to UNCLOS that would address the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction.
81. We call on countries to advance implementation of the Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-based Activities, including further capacity-building and mobilization of resources for investment in treatment of human wastes and waste water and to develop a global action plan to combat marine litter and pollution.
82. We also propose to implement an international observing network for ocean acidification and to work collectively to prevent further ocean acidification.
83. We note that despite agreement to restore global fish stocks to sustainable levels by 2015, many stocks continue to be depleted unsustainably. We call upon States to re-commit
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to maintaining or restoring depleted fish stocks to sustainable levels and to further commit to implementing science-based management plans to rebuild stocks by 2015.
84. We urge countries to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing by adopting and implementing effective tools, in accordance with international law. We note the agreement on port state measures to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing approved by FAO in 2009 and urge States that have not yet acceded to the agreement to do so.
85. We reaffirm that Small Island Developing States (SIDS) remain a special case for sustainable development in view of their unique and particular vulnerabilities. The vulnerability of SIDS has worsened over the last two decades, primarily because of higher exposure to external shocks, including increasing adverse impacts of climate change and more frequent and intense natural disasters as well as the fuel, food, and financial crises, combined with inadequate international support.
86. We call for increased efforts to assist SIDS in implementing the BPOA and MSI and achieving sustainable development, including improvement and strengthening of the relevant entities within the United Nations system that support SIDS' sustainable development. We also call for the convening of the third international conference for the sustainable development of Small Island Developing States in 2014.
[Natural disasters]
87. We reiterate the call for disaster risk reduction to continue to be addressed in the context of sustainable development and placed within the post-2015 development agenda. We call for increased coordination among national, regional and international levels for a robust response to environmental emergencies and improved forecasting and early warning systems, as well as closer coordination between emergency response, early recovery and development efforts, including adoption of a post “Hyogo Framework” and its integration into development policy.
[Climate change]
88. We reaffirm that climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time, and express our deep concern that developing countries are particularly vulnerable to and are experiencing increased negative impacts from climate change, which is severely undermining food security and efforts to eradicate poverty, and also threatens the territorial integrity, viability and the very existence of small island developing states. We welcome the outcome of COP17 at Durban and look forward to the urgent implementation of all the agreements reached.
89. We encourage international initiatives and partnerships to address the interrelationship among water, energy, food and climate change in order to achieve synergies as well as to minimize conflicts among policy objectives, being particularly sensitive to impacts on vulnerable populations.
[Forests and biodiversity]
90. We support policy frameworks and market instruments that effectively slow, halt and reverse deforestation and forest degradation and promote the sustainable use and management of forests, as well as their conservation and restoration. We call for the urgent implementation of the “Non-Legally Binding Instrument on all Types of Forests (NLBI)”.
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91. We welcome the Nagoya Protocol adopted at the tenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biodiversity. We support mainstreaming of biodiversity and ecosystem services in policies and decision-making processes at international, regional and national levels, and encourage investments in natural capital through appropriate incentives and policies, which support a sustainable and equitable use of biological diversity and ecosystems.
[Land degradation and desertification]
92. We recognize the economic and social significance of land, particularly its contribution to growth, food security, and poverty eradication, and note that the intensity of desertification of most of Africa’s arable land is a serious challenge to sustainable development in the region. We call for enhanced support by the international community to the implementation of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD).
93. We agree to support partnerships and initiatives for the safeguarding of soil resources such as the Global Soil Partnership (GSP). We also encourage scientific studies and initiatives aimed at raising wider awareness of the economic benefits of sustainable land management policies that achieve healthy and productive land and soil.
[Mountains]
94. We recognize that mountains are highly vulnerable to global changes such as climate change, and are often home to communities including of indigenous peoples, who have developed sustainable uses of their resources yet are often marginalized, sometimes with high poverty rates, exposure to natural risks and food insecurity. We recognize the benefits derived from mountains and their associated ecosystems. We also recognize the need to explore global, regional, national, and local mechanisms to compensate and reward mountain communities for the services they provide through ecosystem protection.
[Chemicals and waste]
95. We call for strengthening the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management (SAICM), to step up efforts towards a more robust, coherent, effective and efficient international regime for chemicals throughout their lifecycle. Sustainable and adequate long-term funding will be important to assist developing countries with sound chemical and waste management through an integrated approach.
96. We commend the increased coordination and cooperation among the Basel Convention, the Rotterdam Convention and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, and call for public-private partnerships aiming to enhance capacity and technology for environmentally sound waste management. We also note with concern the emerging challenges of electronic waste and plastics in the marine environment, which should be addressed inter alia through appropriate programmes and environmentally sound technologies for material and energy recovery.
[Sustainable Consumption and Production]
97. We agree to establish a 10-Year Framework of Programmes on sustainable consumption and production (SCP) as part of a global pact on sustainable consumption and production, based on the text elaborated in the negotiations in the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development at its nineteenth session.
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[Education]
98. We recognize that access by all people to quality education is an essential condition for sustainable development and social inclusion. We commit to strengthening the contribution of our education systems to the pursuit of sustainable development, including through enhanced teacher training and curricula development.
99. We call upon universities to become models of best practice and transformation by setting an example of sustainability of facilities on their campuses and teaching sustainable development as a module across all disciplines. In this way sustainable practices will become embedded in learning and action.
100. We encourage international education exchange activities on education for sustainable development, including the creation of fellowships and scholarships for international study in disciplines and inter-disciplinary fields pertinent to the promotion of sustainable development.
101. We agree to promote education for sustainable development beyond the end of the United Nations Decade of Education for Sustainable Development in 2014, to educate a new generation of students in the values, key disciplines and holistic, cross-disciplinary approaches essential to promoting sustainable development.
[Gender equality]
102. We recognize that sustainable development is linked to and depends on women’s economic contributions, both formal and informal. We note with concern that persistent social and economic inequities continue to affect women and children, who make up the majority of those living in poverty.
103. We call for removing barriers that have prevented women from being full participants in the economy and unlocking their potential as drivers of sustainable development, and agree to prioritize measures to promote gender equality in all spheres of our societies, including education, employment, ownership of resources, access to justice, political representation, institutional decision-making, care giving and household and community management.
104. We support the work of UN Women in achieving gender equality and the empowerment of women in all aspects of life and bringing greater attention to the linkages between gender equality and the promotion of sustainable development.
B.
Accelerating and measuring progress
105. We recognize that goals, targets and milestones are essential for measuring and accelerating progress towards sustainable development and agree to launch an inclusive process to devise by 2015:
a)
a set of global Sustainable Development Goals that reflect an integrated and balanced treatment of the three dimensions of sustainable development, are consistent with the principles of Agenda 21, and are universal and applicable to all countries but allowing for differentiated approaches among countries;
b)
a mechanism for periodic follow-up and reporting on progress made toward their achievement.
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106. We invite all stakeholders to join this process and request the UN Secretary-General to coordinate this process.
107. We propose that the Sustainable Development Goals could include sustainable consumption and production patterns as well as priority areas such as oceans; food security and sustainable agriculture; sustainable energy for all; water access and efficiency; sustainable cities; green jobs, decent work and social inclusion; and disaster risk reduction and resilience.
108. We consider that the Sustainable Development Goals should complement and strengthen the MDGs in the development agenda for the post-2015 period, with a view to establishing a set of goals in 2015 which are part of the post-2015 UN Development Agenda.
109. We also propose that progress towards these Goals should be measured by appropriate indicators and evaluated by specific targets to be achieved possibly by 2030, and request the Secretary-General for proposals in this regard.
110. We resolve to strengthen the capacity of all countries to collect and analyze data and information needed to support the monitoring of progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals. We request the Secretary-General, with the support of interested donors, the UN system, international organizations and other entities, to promote a global partnership in this regard.
111. We also recognize the limitations of GDP as a measure of well-being. We agree to further develop and strengthen indicators complementing GDP that integrate economic, social and environmental dimensions in a balanced manner. We request the Secretary-General to establish a process in consultation with the UN system and other relevant organizations.
C.
Means of implementation
[Finance]
112. We call for the fulfilment of all official development assistance commitments, including the commitments by many developed countries to achieve the target of 0.7 per cent of gross national product for official development assistance to developing countries by 2015, as well as a target of 0.15 to 0.20 per cent of gross national product for official development assistance to least developed countries. To reach their agreed timetables, donor countries should take all necessary and appropriate measures to raise the rate of aid disbursements to meet their existing commitments. We urge those developed countries that have not yet done so to make additional concrete efforts towards the target of 0.7 per cent of gross national product for official development assistance to developing countries, including the specific target of 0.15 to 0.20 per cent of gross national product for official development assistance to least developed countries in line with the Istanbul Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the decade 2011-2020 in accordance with their commitments.
113. We call for the prioritization of sustainable development in the allocation of resources in line with the priorities and needs of developing countries, and for substantial increases in the provision of financing to developing countries for sustainable development.
114. We call for increased aid effectiveness, taking into account the Paris Declaration, the Accra Action Agenda and the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation in
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ensuring that aid is effective, accountable and responsive to the needs and priorities of developing countries. There is a need for greater coherence at both the international and national levels, including effective oversight of resources to ensure that developing countries have steady and predictable access to adequate financing, including by the private sector, to promote sustainable development.
115. We welcome the ongoing efforts to strengthen and support South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation. We stress that South-South cooperation is not a substitute for, but rather a complement to, North-South cooperation. We also stress that triangular cooperation should be further utilized as an effective modality for development cooperation.
116. We reaffirm the key role of the private sector in promoting sustainable development including through multi-stakeholder partnerships. Public policy should create a stable investment climate and regulatory framework conducive to long-term investment and socially and environmentally responsible behaviour by business and industry.
117. We call for the Global Environment Facility to be strengthened, with regularity in funding flows and reform of governance processes towards more transparent and democratic systems. We urge simplification of procedures and assistance to the least developed countries and SIDS in accessing resources from the GEF.
[Science and Technology]
118. We reaffirm the commitments related to science and technology contained in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Agenda 21 and in the outcomes of other major United Nations Summits and Conferences.
119. We recognize the importance of strengthening the scientific, technological and innovation capacities of countries to promote sustainable development. In this regard, we stress the need for effective mechanisms, enhanced means, appropriate enabling environments, and the removal of obstacles to the scaling up of the development and transfer of technology to developing countries.
120. We agree to strengthen international cooperation conducive to investment and technology transfer, development and diffusion.
[Capacity Building]
121. We reaffirm the need for providing support to existing regional and sub-regional structures and mechanisms in developing countries and encouraging their creation, where needed, with the aim of facilitating cooperation and the exchange of information, including capacity building, exchange of experiences and expertise to advance the implementation of the decisions at regional and sub regional levels.
122. We call for the immediate implementation of the Bali Strategic Plan for Technology Support and Capacity Building.
123. We urge the participation and representation of scientists from developing countries in processes related to global environmental and sustainable development assessment to strengthen scientific capacities in these countries.
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[Trade]
124. We urge the members of the WTO to redouble efforts to achieve a universal, rules-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system and for an early balanced, ambitious and development-oriented outcome of the Doha Development Round of multilateral trade negotiations. We call for the full realization of the commitments made in the 2005 Hong-Kong Ministerial Declaration of the WTO in favour of the least developed countries.
125. We reaffirm that there is an urgent need for the international economic and financial institutions to work together to ensure that developing countries, particularly the least developed countries, are able to benefit from the advantages of the multilateral trade system and their integration into global markets.
126. We support the eventual phase out of market distorting and environmentally harmful subsidies that impede the transition to sustainable development, including those on fossil fuels, agriculture and fisheries, with safeguards to protect vulnerable groups.
127. We support the trade capacity building and facilitation activities of international and regional organizations which would assist developing countries, particularly the least developed countries, in identifying and seizing new export opportunities, including those created by the transition towards a green economy.
[Registry/compendium of commitments]
128. We welcome the voluntary commitments made at Rio+20 and invite the Secretary-General to compile them in a registry/compendium that will serve as an accountability framework.
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